# Opensource---Round 5---Texas

# 1NC

## OFF

### 1NC---T CWS

#### The scope of competition law defines it goals---attempts to meet current goals by banning practice are implementation questions.

ESE No Date. Erasmus School of Economics (as per their website, “The Erasmus Center for Economic and Financial Governance is an international multidisciplinary network of leading researchers and societal stakeholders initiated by researchers from Erasmus School of Economics and Erasmus School of Law. ECEFG conducts interdisciplinary research (law, economics and political science) and contributes to current debates in public and in academia on issues relating to European and global economic and financial governance.”). "Competition Policy". <https://www.eur.nl/en/ese/affiliated/ecefg/research/competition-policy>

Competition Policy

Research in this field consists of two broad areas. The first area – Theory and Implementation of Competition Law and Policy – refers to fundamental and applied research into topics that are traditionally seen as the core of competition policy. The second area – Scope of Competition Law and Policy – refers to all research on the effect and desirability of including new considerations in competition law and policy in order to address the challenges of our time, such as the increasing power of big tech firms, or global warming.

Theory and Implementation of Competition Policy

This covers for instance collusion, abuse of dominance, mergers, market regulation and state aid. Some examples of research topics are:

* the practices firms can use to engage in collusion and its welfare consequences;
* the practices firms can use to abuse a dominant position and its welfare consequences;
* which practices can be considered proof of such activities;
* how to regulate access to a market;
* how to properly assess the effects of a particular practice or merger;
* the practices, by which the state and public authorities distort competition such as subisidies and tax measures
* the interpretation and application of EU and national competition law by Competition Authorities and Courts and the extent to which they achieve the goals of competition policy

Scope of Competition Policy

The effectiveness of European competition law and policy in combination with rapid technological changes have raised questions about its proper scope. Which policy objectives can and should be pursued by means of competition law and policy, and which should be delegated to other legal fields and policies? Some examples of specific research questions include:

* Can and should competition law be used to protect the privacy of consumers on the internet?
* Information gathered by firms can be used to increase their own profits. How does this affect consumers, and what does this depend on? Can and should competition law deal with market power derived from information gathering? For instance, should the big five tech giants be forced to divest activities?
* Should competition policy also include considerations of economic inequality or environmental effects?
* Can competition law remain effective if it is used for more than safeguarding fair competition?

#### That means the aff must replace the consumer welfare standard.

Trevor Wagener 21. "The Curse of Tradeoffs: Neo-Brandeisians vs. Consumers". Disruptive Competition Project. 5-21-2021. https://www.project-disco.org/competition/052121-the-curse-of-tradeoffs-neo-brandeisian-antitrust-versus-consumers/

Neo-Brandeisians seek to replace the longstanding objective and principles-based framework of the consumer welfare standard in antitrust enforcement with an amorphous, process-based framework guided by an ethos one Neo-Brandeisian described as: “Big is bad. Just don’t let big firms merge. The end.” A movement dedicated to replacing a consumer welfare-maximizing approach with an assortment of competing goals has proven unable to offer a quantified, systematic cost-benefit analysis justifying such a radical change, instead relying upon anecdotal evidence and moving prose. The many goals of the Neo-Brandeisian approach are often rhetorically appealing, but the rhetoric hides a simple truth: When you target every variable, you effectively target none. Addressing a wide range of goals through antitrust policy requires de-emphasizing consumer welfare, creating fundamental tradeoffs expected to harm consumers relative to the status quo.

The willingness to sacrifice consumer welfare in order to achieve other ends is a defining characteristic of Neo-Brandeisian antitrust. This is illustrated by concrete Neo-Brandeisian critiques, which typically emphasize perceived harms to businesses rather than harms to consumers. For example, the Neo-Brandeisian activist group American Economic Liberties Project (AELP) published a pair of policy briefs on May 3 that criticize online service operators for a litany of purported inconveniences to businesses over a combined 22 pages, but struggle to quantify any harms to ordinary consumers and users. Those few purported harms to consumers that AELP raised are distinctly qualitative rather than quantitative, consistent with the broader reluctance of prominent Neo-Brandeisian thinkers to conduct a rigorous quantitative cost-benefit analysis of their antitrust policy prescriptions relative to the consumer welfare standard.

#### Vote negative for limits and ground---only “change goals” creates key economy and legal disads over what antitrust should consider---the affs topic races to tiny exemptions and technical changes with no core ground.

### 1NC---T Business Practices

#### Business practices are ongoing conduct defined by the behaviors of many market participants

Kerry Lynn Macintosh 97, Associate Professor of Law, Santa Clara University School of Law. B.A. 1978, Pomona College; J.D. 1982, Stanford University, “Liberty, Trade, and the Uniform Commercial Code: When Should Default Rules Be Based On Business Practices?,” 38 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1465, Lexis

These new and revised articles reflect a strong trend toward choosing default rules 4 that codify existing business practices. 5 [FOOTNOTE 5 BEGINS] In this Article, the term "business practices" is used to refer to practices that emerge over time as countless market participants exercise their freedom to engage in profitable transactions. For an account of the evolution of business practices, see infra Part II. As used here, "business practices" is broader and less technical than "trade usage," which the Code narrowly defines as "any practice or method of dealing having such regularity of observance in a place, vocation, or trade as to justify an expectation that it will be observed with respect to the transaction in question." U.C.C. 1-205(2). [FOOTNOTE 5 ENDS] This is particularly true of the recent revisions to Articles 3 (Negotiable Instruments), 4 (Bank Deposits and Collections) and 5 (Letters of Credit).

#### Prohibit means forbid by authority

Merriam-Webster No Date <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/prohibition> and <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/prohibiting>

Definition of prohibition 1: the act of prohibiting by authority

Definition of prohibit transitive verb 1: to forbid by authority : ENJOIN

#### Only per se illegality prohibits a practice---rules of reason prohibit anticompetitive effects for individual acts, or instances of ‘practice.’

John Paul Stevens 90, Justice, Supreme Court of the United States, “FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n,” 493 U.S. 411, Lexis

LEdHN[3C] [3C]LEdHN[14] [14]Equally important is the second error implicit in respondents' claim to immunity from the per se rules. In its opinion, the Court of Appeals assumed that the antitrust laws permit, but do not require, the condemnation of price fixing and boycotts without proof of market power. 15 The opinion further assumed that the per se rule prohibiting such activity "is only a rule of 'administrative convenience and efficiency,' not a statutory command." 272 U.S. App. D. C., at 295, 856 F. 2d, at 249.This statement contains two errors. HN10 [\*\*\*\*42] The per se [\*433] rules are, of course, the product of judicial interpretations of the Sherman Act, but the rules nevertheless have the same force and effect as any other statutory commands. Moreover, while the per se rule against price fixing and boycotts is indeed justified in part by "administrative convenience," the Court of Appeals erred in describing the prohibition as justified only by such concerns. The per se rules also reflect a long-standing judgment that the prohibited practices by their nature have "a substantial potential for impact on competition." Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 16 (1984).

[\*\*\*\*43] LEdHN[15] [15]As we explained in Professional Engineers, HN11 the rule of reason in antitrust law generates

"two complementary categories of antitrust analysis. In the first category are agreements whose nature and necessary effect are so plainly anticompetitive that no elaborate study of the industry is needed to establish their illegality -- they are 'illegal per se.' In the second category are agreements whose competitive effect can only be evaluated by analyzing the facts peculiar to the business, the history of the restraint, and the reasons why it was imposed." 435 U.S., at 692.

[\*\*\*873] "Once experience with a particular kind of restraint enables the Court to predict with confidence that the rule of reason will condemn it, it has applied a conclusive presumption that the restraint is unreasonable." Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society, 457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982).

[\*\*781] LEdHN[16] [16] [\*\*\*\*44] The per se rules in antitrust law serve purposes analogous to per se restrictions upon, for example, stunt flying in congested areas or speeding. Laws prohibiting stunt flying or setting speed limits are justified by the State's interest in protecting human life and property. Perhaps most violations of such rules actually cause no harm. No doubt many experienced drivers and pilots can operate much more safely, even at prohibited speeds, than the average citizen.

[\*434] If the especially skilled drivers and pilots were to paint messages on their cars, or attach streamers to their planes, their conduct would have an expressive component. High speeds and unusual maneuvers would help to draw attention to their messages. Yet the laws may nonetheless be enforced against these skilled persons without proof that their conduct was actually harmful or dangerous.

In part, the justification for these per se rules is rooted in administrative convenience. They are also supported, however, by the observation that every speeder and every stunt pilot poses some threat to the community. An unpredictable event may overwhelm the skills of the best driver or pilot, even if the [\*\*\*\*45] proposed course of action was entirely prudent when initiated. A bad driver going slowly may be more dangerous that a good driver going quickly, but a good driver who obeys the law is safer still.

#### Prefer it:

#### 1) Ground---key to link uniqueness and a unidirectional topic. Fringe standards dodge topic links.

#### 2) Limits---too many possible standards makes the topic too large.

### 1NC---FTC DA

#### FTC’s increasing enforcement in privacy now---it’s focused on algorithmic bias.

James V. Fazio 21. Special counsel in the Intellectual Property Practice Group at Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP, with Liisa M. Thomas, 3/11. “What Is FTC’s Course Under Biden?” https://www.natlawreview.com/article/what-ftc-s-course-under-biden

The new acting FTC chair, Rebecca Kelly Slaughter, recently signaled that the FTC may increase enforcement and penalties in the privacy and data security realm. Slaughter pointed to several areas of focus for the FTC this year, which companies will want to keep in mind: Notifying Consumers About FTC Allegations: Slaughter referred favorably to two recent cases: (1) the Everalbum biometric settlement from earlier this year (which we wrote about at the time); and (2) the Flo Health settlement over alleged deceptive data sharing practices (which we also wrote about at the time). In drawing on these two cases, Slaughter indicated that in future cases the FTC intends to include as part of any settlement a requirement to notify customers of any FTC allegations. This, she said, would allow consumers to “vote with their feet” and help them decide whether to recommend their services to others. FTC Intent to Plead All Relevant Violations: According to Slaughter, another lesson the FTC is taking from the Flo case is to include in the cases it brings all potentially applicable violations of all relevant privacy-related laws. In the Flo case, Slaughter said the FTC should have pleaded a violation of the Health Breach Notification Rule, which requires that vendors of personal health records notify consumers of data breaches. Focus on Ed Tech and COPPA: Given the explosive growth of education technology during COVID-19, the FTC is conducting an industry sweep of the industry. Related to this, the FTC is reviewing its Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act Rule. This goes beyond the refresh the agency did of their FAQs earlier in the pandemic (which we wrote about at the time). For now, Slaughter reminds companies that parental consent is needed before collecting information online from children under the age of 13. Examination of Health Apps: The FTC will take a closer look at health apps, including telehealth and contact tracing apps, as more and more consumers are relying on such apps to manage their health during the pandemic. Overlap Between Competition and Privacy: Slaughter also indicated that it is worth looking at situations where there may be not only privacy concerns, but antitrust as well. Because the FTC has a dual mission (consumer protection and competition) she notes that it has a “structural advantage” over other regulators in that it can look at these issues, especially since -she states- “many of the largest players in digital markets are as powerful as they are because of the breadth of their access to and control over consumer data.” Racial Equality and AI/Biometrics/Geotracking: Slaughter noted that COVID-19 is exacerbating racial inequities. She pointed to the unequal access to technology, as well as algorithmic discrimination (the idea that discrimination offline becomes embedded into algorithmic system logic). The FTC intends to focus on algorithmic discrimination, as well as on the discrimination potentially embedded into facial recognition technologies. (This mirrors concerns that gave rise to the recent Portland facial recognition law, which we recently wrote about). Finally, Slaughter commented on the use of location data to identify characteristics of Black Lives Matter protesters, and said she is concerned about the misuse of location data to track Americans engaged in constitutionally protected speech. Putting it Into Practice: Companies that operate health apps, that are in the education technology space, or that use algorithms or facial recognition tools will want to keep in mind that these are areas of focus for the FTC. And for everyone, keep in mind that the FTC has indicated it will beef up privacy law penalties and will ask for more notification to injured consumers.

#### Antitrust enforcement saps up FTC resources and personnel, which are finite.

Tara L. Reinhart, et al. 21. \*\*Head of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP’s Antitrust/Competition Group. \*\*Steven C. Sunshine, Co-head of Skadden, Arps, Slat, Meagher & Flom LLP’s Antitrust/Competition Group. \*\*David P. Whales, antitrust lawyer with over 25 years of experience in both private and public sectors. \*\*Julia Y. York, partner at Skadden, Arps, Slat, Meagher & Flom LLP. \*\*Bre Jordan, associate at Skadden, Arps, Slat, Meagher & Flom LLP focusing on antitrust law. “Lina Khan’s Appointment as FTC Chair Reflects Biden Administration’s Aggressive Stance on Antitrust Enforcement.” 6/18/21. https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2021/06/lina-khans-appointment-as-ftc-chair

Second, like all antitrust enforcers, Ms. Khan and the FTC will face resource constraints. Bringing antitrust litigation is an expensive and laborious process, often requiring millions of dollars for expert fees and a large army of FTC staff attorneys and taking many months or even years to accomplish. Typically, the FTC can only litigate a handful of antitrust matters at a time. It seems likely that Congress will provide more funding to the FTC in the current environment, but even with these extra resources, the FTC will still have to pick its cases carefully and cannot challenge every deal or every instance of alleged unlawful conduct.

#### That trades off with the necessary resources for privacy enforcement.

John O. McGinnis\* and Linda Sun\*\* 20. \*George C. Dix Professor, Northwestern University, and Associate-Designate, Wilmer Pickering Hale & Dorr LLP. “Unifying Antitrust Enforcement for the Digital Age.” Northwestern Public Law Research Paper No. 20-20. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=3669087

The FTC needs more resources to adequately address the nation’s growing privacy concerns. Currently, the FTC oversees both consumer protection—encompassing privacy—and antitrust,249 making the FTC the chief federal agency on privacy policy and enforcement250 and the nation’s de-facto privacy agency.251 The agency has long-standing experience in enforcing privacy statutes252 and also has special privacy assets, such as an internet lab capable of high-quality tech forensics to track invasions of privacy.253 The FTC, however, has failed to keep pace with the massive growth of privacy concerns—a phenomenon also driven by modern technology. Very few Americans feel conﬁdent in the privacy of their information in the digital age.254 According to a 2019 study, over 80% of Americans feel that they have little to no control over the data collected on them by companies and the government.255 To adequately address privacy concerns, the FTC needs more resources.256 The agency has been explicit that it needs more manpower to police tech companies. In requesting increased funding from Congress, FTC Director Joseph Simons said the money would allow the agency to hire additional staff and bring more privacy cases.257 A former director of the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection, which houses the privacy unit, has called the FTC “woefully understaffed.”258 As of the spring of 2019, the FTC had only forty employees dedicated to privacy and data security, compared to 500 and 110 employees at comparable agencies in the UK. and Ireland, respectively.259 Without more lawyers, investigators, and technologists, the FTC will be forced to conduct privacy investigations less thoroughly, and in some cases, forgo them altogether.260 Currently, the FT C’s resources are spread thin across multiple missions, to the detriment of its privacy efforts. Removing the agency’s antitrust responsibilities would reallocate resources from the antitrust department to its privacy unit and other areas of consumer protection. Further, it would free up the scarce time of the commissioners to oversee this essential effort.261

#### Unchecked algorithmic bias risks massive inequality and extinction.

Mike Thomas 20. Quoting AI experts including MIT Physics Professors, Senior Features Writer for BuiltIn. THE FUTURE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: 7 ways AI can change the world for better ... or worse, Updated: April 20, 2020, <https://builtin.com/artificial-intelligence/artificial-intelligence-future>

Klabjan also puts little stock in extreme scenarios — the type involving, say, murderous cyborgs that turn the earth into a smoldering hellscape. He’s much more concerned with machines — war robots, for instance — being fed faulty “incentives” by nefarious humans. As MIT physics professors and leading AI researcher Max Tegmark put it in a 2018 TED Talk, “The real threat from AI isn’t malice, like in silly Hollywood movies, but competence — AI accomplishing goals that just aren’t aligned with ours.” That’s Laird’s take, too. “I definitely don’t see the scenario where something wakes up and decides it wants to take over the world,” he says. “I think that’s science fiction and not the way it’s going to play out.” What Laird worries most about isn’t evil AI, per se, but “evil humans using AI as a sort of false force multiplier” for things like bank robbery and credit card fraud, among many other crimes. And so, while he’s often frustrated with the pace of progress, AI’s slow burn may actually be a blessing. “Time to understand what we’re creating and how we’re going to incorporate it into society,” Laird says, “might be exactly what we need.” But no one knows for sure. “There are several major breakthroughs that have to occur, and those could come very quickly,” Russell said during his Westminster talk. Referencing the rapid transformational effect of nuclear fission (atom splitting) by British physicist Ernest Rutherford in 1917, he added, “It’s very, very hard to predict when these conceptual breakthroughs are going to happen.” But whenever they do, if they do, he emphasized the importance of preparation. That means starting or continuing discussions about the ethical use of A.G.I. and whether it should be regulated. That means working to eliminate data bias, which has a corrupting effect on algorithms and is currently a fat fly in the AI ointment. That means working to invent and augment security measures capable of keeping the technology in check. And it means having the humility to realize that just because we can doesn’t mean we should. “Our situation with technology is complicated, but the big picture is rather simple,” Tegmark said during his TED Talk. “Most AGI researchers expect AGI within decades, and if we just bumble into this unprepared, it will probably be the biggest mistake in human history. It could enable brutal global dictatorship with unprecedented inequality, surveillance, suffering and maybe even human extinction. But if we steer carefully, we could end up in a fantastic future where everybody’s better off—the poor are richer, the rich are richer, everybody’s healthy and free to live out their dreams.”

### 1NC---Regs CP

#### The United States federal government, including the federal judiciary, should:

#### Maintain the current scope of its core antitrust laws and announce its intent to do so.

#### Substantially increase prohibitions on private sector conduct that is more restrictive of competition than reasonably necessary to enable creation of information technology standards under patent and contract law and establish treble damages for violation.

#### Solves and competes---only the FTC and the DOJ enforce antitrust laws.

Michael Kades 19. Director for markets and competition policy at the Washington Center for Equitable Growth. “The state of U.S. federal antitrust enforcement”. Washington Center for Equitable Growth. 9-17-2019. https://equitablegrowth.org/research-paper/the-state-of-u-s-federal-antitrust-enforcement/?longform=true

Discussion about the current U.S. antitrust enforcement regime has been less systematic. Critics have pointed to where they believe federal enforcers have dropped the ball, such as the failure to challenge specific merger transactions or to attack the business practices of certain technology platforms. Defenders of the two federal agencies in charge of enforcement—the U.S. Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission—have pointed to the areas where the agencies have been aggressive (such as the Department of Justice’s case against American Express Co.) or tenacious (such as the FTC’s enforcement agenda against hospital mergers).

### 1NC---Forecasting CP

#### The United States should only allow the continuation of private sector conduct that is more restrictive of competition than reasonably necessary to enable creation of information technology standards under antitrust law only when a team of the Good Judgment Project’s “super-forecasters” has determined that the activity reduces the numerical probability of the harm to competition from an unacceptably high level.

\* The Good Judgment Project’s “Super-forecasters” are team members of the Good Judgement Project that have ended in the top 2% of forecasters tournaments, selected by Tetlock’s team.

#### It competes---the counterplan is a regulation not prohibition.

James Broaddus 50. February 6; Judge on the Kansas City Court of Appeals, Missouri; Westlaw, “City of Meadville v. Caselman,” 240 Mo. App. 1220. https://casetext.com/case/city-of-meadville-v-caselman-1

"Under power conferred on cities of the fourth class `to regulate and license' dramshops, there is no authority to wholly prohibit or suppress. Where there is mere power in a municipality to regulate in a state, with a general policy of conducting licensed saloons, authority to prohibit is excluded. The difference between regulation and prohibition is clear and well marked. The former contemplates the continuance of the subject-matter in existence or in activity. The latter implies its entire destruction or cessation.'" (Citing text writers and cases.)

#### ONLY the counterplan solves the case---the plan can’t keep up with market changes.

AMC 07. Antitrust Modernization Commission. Deborah A. Garza, Chair. Bobby R. Burchfield ,Commissioner. W. Stephen Cannon, Commissioner. Dennis W. Carlton, Commissioner. Makan Delrahim, Commissioner. Jonathan M. Jacobson, Commissioner. Jonathan R. Yarowsky, Vice-Chair. Donald G. Kempf, Jr., Commissioner. Sanford M. Litvack, Commissioner. John H. Shenefield, Commissioner. Debra A. Valentine, Commissioner. John L. Warden, Commissioner. “Report and Recommendations.” https://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report\_recommendation/amc\_final\_report.pdf

To determine whether and when particular forms of business conduct may harm competition requires an understanding of the market circumstances in which they are undertaken. Antitrust agencies and the courts have long looked to economic learning for assistance in understanding market circumstances and the likely competitive effects of particular business conduct.23 Indeed, economics now provides the core foundation for much of antitrust law. Not surprisingly, as economic learning about competition has advanced over the decades, so have the contours of antitrust doctrine.

Antitrust law also must keep pace with developments in the business world. Business practices may change, especially as technological innovation and global economic integration alter the competitive forces at work in particular markets. To protect competition and consumer welfare, antitrust analysis must offer sufficient flexibility to take account of these changes, while maintaining clear and administrable rules of antitrust enforcement.

B. Periodic Assessments of the Antitrust Laws Are Advisable

The antitrust laws in the United States require ongoing evaluation and assessment to ensure they are keeping pace with both economic learning and the ever-changing economy.24 In past decades, various entities have empowered six different commissions to assess how well antitrust law operates to serve consumers. The Antitrust Modernization Commission is the seventh such commission in almost seventy years.25 Prior commissions have made recommendations about both the substance and procedure of antitrust law.

#### Flexibility is key to super forecasting competition policy---the aff locks in policy failure.

Michelle Baddeley 17. Institute for Choice, University of South Australia. Journal of Behavioral Economics for Policy, Vol. 1, No. 1, 27-31, 2017. “Experts in policy land - Insights from behavioral economics on improving experts’ advice for policy-makers”. https://sabeconomics.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/JBEP-1-1-4-F.pdf

Whichever side one takes on these political divides, if the modern fashion is to allow subjective, partisan opinions to trump expert advice, what are the likely implications? Is it wise to be so mistrustful of experts? Expert advice is irreplaceable. Scientific experts and academics play a crucial role in developing new findings and insights to help inform policy, with implications across the range of human activity – from health and environmental policy through to competition policy, consumer protection and financial regulation – to name just a few. But to what extent are experts objective and impartial? Is their advice really impartial and unbiased, based around a cool and calculating objective assessment of evidence, after the careful application of robust research methodologies? In practice - uncertainty, insufficient information, unreliable data or flawed analysis can limit the expert’s ability to untangle the truth, and make it difficult for the policy-maker to assess the extent to which expert advice is reliable. Robust statistical methods, careful experimental design and clear hypotheses can guide the expert but impartial advice is also compromised by a range of economic, behavioural and socio-psychological constraints, some of which may be beyond the expert’s conscious control. Heuristics, biases and social influences driving experts can have significant negative consequences for the public, especially if misleading research findings are used to guide public policy.

This paper will explore some of these influences on experts’ judgement. In Section 2, some of problems around information, risk and uncertainty are outlined; in Section 3, key economic and socio-psychological constraints are explored. Policy implications and solutions are suggested in Section 3, focussing on how we can ensure that expert advice is devised and applied in the most robust and objective ways possible.

Information, risk and uncertainty

Risk and uncertainty is an unavoidable problem, especially for the scientific research that backs up expert judgement because it is about investigating novel, poorly understood phenomena. When information is scarce, a situation is profoundly uncertainty, and/or we have had no prior experience of an event or phenomenon, we cannot quantify the risk of one event versus another. Frequency ratios capturing the incidence of similar events in the past are of no use when there have been no similar events in the past. Given uncertainty, it is not possible to tell before the fact whether experts are right or wrong. It is not like we have given them a difficult mathematical problem which we can double check ourselves using a computer or calculator. With scientific research and expert advice – there is no way to know what the truth might be, and that is why we need experts to find it. And we can only judge expert judgements with the benefit of hindsight, if at all. This is a Catch-22: we need expert evidence to judge expert evidence.

An example of how policy-makers confront these problems of uncertainty and poor information affecting expert advice is the work of the Hazardous Substances Advisory Committee (HSAC) – an advisory committee to the UK’s Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs. This committee focuses on another complication arising from uncertainty – the difference between a risk and a hazard. Hazards exist, they are there – but if we know where they are, we can avoid them and thereby minimize our risk. The problem comes in knowing what and where the hazards are. Scientific experts on HSAC – including a range of toxicologists, environmental scientists and biochemists, as well as social scientists – assess evidence to help to inform the UK’s regulatory policy with respect to chemicals harmful to the environment and human health. Often a key constraint is that they are asked to provide advice around the likely environmental impacts of hazardous substances such as endocrine disruptors, antiobiotics and nanomaterials – often we do not know too much about these substances and their long-term impacts, especially for innovative technologies such as nanomaterials. HSAC has therefore devised a structure for assessing the quality of evidence when information is scarce and uncertainty is endemic –spanning not only the usual scientific evidence around experiments and field observation, but also including computational modelling and anecdotal evidence (Collins et al. 2016). For experts used to analysing large data sets, the latter would seem like an anathema but when experts are facing fundamental uncertainty the types of evidence they might use must expand accordingly. If we are forced to rely on anecdote, we need to understand what distinguishes good anecdotal evidence from bad anecdotal evidence: anecdotes that are corroborated across a range of sources are more reliable than single anecdotes, for example.

Economic and socio-psychological constraints

The problems of poor information, risk and uncertainty are not about the fallibility of individuals or even differences between individuals – either in terms of their individual differences and characters, and/or their susceptibility to biases and social influences. Once we introduce these additional constraints – which reflect the characters of the experts not the nature of the evidence – the opportunities for mistakes and misleading guidance increase significantly.

Individual differences

Individual differences seem to play a role, including in terms of innate ability to make judgements about uncertain futures. Philip Tetlock conducted a study which showed that, in forecasting uncertain future events, most experts are only just better than an ordinary person guessing at random (Tetlock 2006). In a second study, however – a collaboration with Dan Gardner – he showed that some particular individuals – experts or not – are “super-forecasters” who have a particular aptitude for forecasting (Tetlock and Gardner 2015). What ideal characteristics might enable these super-forecasters to predict so well? In a complex world, we need experts who are able to understand and analyse a wide range of evidence. Do we need experts who can cover a broad range, or experts who know a narrow field very well? Linking to Isaiah Berlin’s distinction between the fox-types who have a wide but relatively superficial knowledge, and the hedgehog-types who have a deep but relatively narrow knowledge, Tetlock (2006) argues that we may prefer to be advised by foxes – who know many little things, can draw on an eclectic range of evidence and are able to improvise relatively easily when evidence shifts. The hedgehogs, who know one area very well and focus on one tradition may be too inclined to impose formulaic and inflexible solutions.

#### Binding forecasting is key to spillover---solves security.

J. Peter Scoblic and Philip E. Tetlock 20. J. Peter Scoblic is Co-Founder of Event Horizon Strategies, a Senior Fellow in the International Security Program at New America, and a Fellow at Harvard’s Kennedy School. Philip E. Tetlock is Leonore Annenberg University Professor at the University of Pennsylvania, Co-Founder of Good Judgment, and a co-author of Superforecasting: The Art and Science of Prediction. “A Better Crystal Ball The Right Way to Think About the Future”. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-10-13/better-crystal-ball

The greatest barrier to a clearer vision of the future is not philosophical but organizational: the potential of combining scenario planning with probabilistic forecasting means nothing if it is not implemented. On occasion, the intelligence community has used forecasting tournaments to inform its estimates, but that is only a first step. Policymakers and consumers of intelligence are the ones who must understand the importance of forecasts and incorporate them into their decisions. Too often, operational demands—the daily business of organizations, from weighty decisions to the mundane—fix attention on the current moment.

Overcoming the tyranny of the present requires high-level action and broad, sustained effort. Leaders across the U.S. government must cultivate the cognitive habits of top forecasters throughout their organizations, while also institutionalizing the imaginative processes of scenario planners. The country’s prosperity, its security, and, ultimately, its power all depend on policymakers’ ability to envision long-term futures, anticipate short-term developments, and use both projections to inform everything from the budget to grand strategy. Giving the future short shrift only shortchanges the United States.

### 1NC---K

#### The 1AC’s competitive-state model reinforces taken-for-granted nationalism---it makes answering transnational questions impossible.

Pauli Kettunen 21. Professor of Political History in the Social Science Faculty of University of Helsinki. "Welfare state, competition state, security state: Nationalism in nation-state responses to crossborder mobilities." In Remapping Security on Europe’s Northern Borders, pp. 201-220. Routledge, 2021.

Democratic welfare nationalism, competitiveness-seeking nationalism, and security-seeking nationalism appear as rational nation-state policies and are generally not associated with nationalism. It is reasonable to argue that the persistent limits of the conventional use of “nationalism” outside specialist studies of nations and nationalism indicate the power of nationalism as a taken-for-granted mode of thought and action. Taken-for-granted nationalism seems to be reinforced by the intertwining of democratic welfare nationalism with competitiveness-seeking and security-seeking nationalism. There is thus a self-reinforcing circle. The extent to which globalisation is defined as a national challenge reinforces the role of competitiveness and security in political agenda setting, and the extent to which competitiveness and security frame the political agenda assists them to maintain national perspectives to globalisation.

From the welfare-state, competition-state, and security-state perspectives “nationalism” is not a tool for self-description, but for condemning xenophobic and racist far-right nationalism. However, the taken-for-granted nationalism justifying the nation-state limits of these perspectives provides a readymade framework for xenophobic nationalism. The distinctions between us and others and between the internal and external are a shared point of departure, but instead of policies recognising their interdependencies, xenophobic nationalism turns the us-other distinction into an exclusionary us-against-them divide, and the internal-external distinction into a motive for stricter borders.

The emphasis on the national “us” in mainstream modes of combining welfare-state, competition-state, and security-state arguments may facilitate populist protests that accuse the elite of betraying the people. There are similarities with how the nation as an imagined community provided subordinated social groups with the criteria for a collective critique of existing society and created preconditions for the labour movement. However, while the working class was able to motivate its demands by referring to its central role in the production of life’s necessities, the social divides associated with current projects for a national competitive community give little scope for such arguments.

We may find that an insoluble tension appears between what is recognised as the institutional preconditions of competitiveness, and how its content is conceived. At the same time as egalitarian institutions and participatory practices can be defended as preconditions for knowledge-based competitiveness, true membership in a competitive community is a matter of individual competitiveness. This in turn consists of communicative and innovative skills, talent, and a reflexive capacity to monitor oneself from the perspective of competitiveness. Besides winners and losers, some people cannot even participate in this competition.

Individual deficiencies or the unavoidable imperatives of the global economy tend to be offered as explanations for grievances. Welfare-state policies aim to improve individual capacities and compensate for job losses, yet it is far from self-evident that people willingly accept individualised or naturalised explanations. Political implications may be found in constructions demarcating collective threat images and in the support for right-wing populist parties that have managed, not least in the Nordic countries, to merge nostalgic welfare nationalism and xenophobic nationalism.

While the emphasis on “us” in the making of national competitive communities is an integral part of global capitalism, the same transformations may also either erode the solidarity based on common spatial ties or open new crossnational and crossterritorial perspectives for defining “us”. A multicircle non-divisive understanding of “us” would arguably require a transnational democratic dimension in defining problems and solutions. Inspiration may be found in the ideas of policy coordination beyond nation states and European regional integration that Gunnar Myrdal proposed in his 1950s critique of the nationalism of democratic Western welfare states. In any case, even good answers to questions of national competitiveness and security fail to answer questions of democracy, citizenship, social equality, and the ecological preconditions of life. There is a risk that the reinforced emphasis on the competition-state and security-state aspects of the nation state will make it even more difficult to formulate such questions to effectively recognise that they are simultaneously local, national, European, and global.

#### Epochal transformation makes crisis transnational---methodological nationalism fails.

Ulrich Beck 14. Institute of Sociology, Munich, Germany. “We Do Not Live in an Age of Cosmopolitanism but in an Age of Cosmopolitization: The ‘Global Other’ is in Our Midst.” https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7124081/

The collapse of a world order is often a moment for reflection on the dominant social theory and research of the time, but surprisingly this is not the case today.1 Mainstream social theory still floats loftily above the lowlands of epochal transformations (climate change, financial crisis, nation-states) in a condition of universalistic superiority and instinctive certainty. This universalistic social theory, whether structuralist, interactionist, Marxist, critical or systems-theory, is now both out of date and provincial. Out of date because it excludes a priori what can be observed empirically: a fundamental transformation of society and politics within modernity (from first to second modernity)2; provincial because it mistakenly absolutizes the trajectory, the historical experience and future expectation of Western, i.e. predominantly European or North American, modernization and thereby also fails to see its own particularity.

This is why we need a cosmopolitan turn in social and political theory and research (Beck/Grande 2010a). How can social and political theory be opened up, theoretically, empirically as well as methodologically and normatively, to historically new, entangled modernities which threaten their own foundations? How can it account for the fundamental fragility and mutability of societal dynamics of domination and power shaped, as they are, by the globalization of capital and risks at the beginning of the twenty-first century? What theoretical and methodological problems arise and how can they be addressed in empirical research? Here I want to discuss these questions in five steps.

First, I will call into question one of the most powerful convictions about society and politics, one which binds both social actors and social scientists: methodological nationalism. Methodological nationalism equates modern society with society organized in territorially limited nation-states. Second, I propose to draw an essential distinction between cosmopolitanism in a normative philosophical sense and cosmopolitization as a social scientific research programme. Third, I am going to illustrate this paradigm shift by re-mapping social inequalities; and, fourth, by discussing world risk society and its political dynamics. Fifth and finally, I will pick up the question: what does a ‘cosmopolitan vision’ imply for the social sciences and humanities at the beginning of the twenty-first century?

#### Vote negative to challenge the Westphalian frame.

#### Taken-for-granted nationalism is up for contestation and determines the scope of justice ---the “who” of politics predetermines the “what” of policy. Only shifting the grammar of argument can address the global nature of crisis.

Nancy Fraser 05. Henry A. and Louise Loeb Professor of Political and Social Science and professor of philosophy at The New School. “Reframing Justice in a Globalizing World, NLR 36, November–December 2005.” New Left Review. https://newleftreview-org.proxy.library.emory.edu/issues/ii36/articles/nancy-fraser-reframing-justice-in-a-globalizing-world

Globalization is changing the way we argue about justice.footnote1 Not so long ago, in the heyday of social democracy, disputes about justice presumed what I shall call a ‘Keynesian-Westphalian frame’. Typically played out within modern territorial states, arguments about justice were assumed to concern relations among fellow citizens, to be subject to debate within national publics, and to contemplate redress by national states. This was true for each of two major families of justice claims—claims for socioeconomic redistribution and claims for legal or cultural recognition. At a time when the Bretton Woods system facilitated Keynesian economic steering at the national level, claims for redistribution usually focused on economic inequities within territorial states. Appealing to national public opinion for a fair share of the national pie, claimants sought intervention by national states in national economies. Likewise, in an era still gripped by a Westphalian political imaginary, which sharply distinguished ‘domestic’ from ‘international’ space, claims for recognition generally concerned internal status hierarchies. Appealing to the national conscience for an end to nationally institutionalized disrespect, claimants pressed national governments to outlaw discrimination and accommodate differences among citizens. In both cases, the Keynesian-Westphalian frame was taken for granted. Whether the matter concerned redistribution or recognition, class differentials or status hierarchies, it went without saying that the unit within which justice applied was the modern territorial state.footnote2

To be sure, there were always exceptions. Occasionally, famines and genocides galvanized public opinion across borders. And some cosmopolitans and anti-imperialists sought to promulgate globalist views.footnote3 But these were exceptions that proved the rule. Relegated to the sphere of ‘the international’, they were subsumed within a problematic that was focused primarily on matters of security, as opposed to justice. The effect was to reinforce, rather than to challenge, the Keynesian-Westphalian frame. That framing of disputes about justice generally prevailed by default from the end of the Second World War to the 1970s.

Although it went unnoticed at the time, this framework lent a distinctive shape to arguments about social justice. Taking for granted the modern territorial state as the appropriate unit, and its citizens as the pertinent subjects, such arguments turned on what precisely those citizens owed one another. In the eyes of some, it sufficed that citizens be formally equal before the law; for others, equality of opportunity was also required; for still others, justice demanded that all citizens gain access to the resources and respect they needed in order to be able to participate on a par with others, as full members of the political community. The argument focused, in other words, on exactly what should count as a just ordering of social relations within a society. Engrossed in disputing the ‘what’ of justice, the contestants apparently felt no necessity to dispute the ‘who’. With the Keynesian-Westphalian frame securely in place, it went without saying that the ‘who’ was the national citizenry.

Today, however, this framework is losing its aura of self-evidence. Thanks to heightened awareness of globalization, and to post-Cold War geopolitical instabilities, many observe that the social processes shaping their lives routinely overflow territorial borders. They note, for example, that decisions taken in one territorial state often have an impact on the lives of those outside it, as do the actions of transnational corporations, international currency speculators, and large institutional investors. Many also note the growing salience of supranational and international organizations, both governmental and non-governmental, and of transnational public opinion, which flows with supreme disregard for borders through global mass media and cybertechnology. The result is a new sense of vulnerability to transnational forces. Faced with global warming, the spread of aids, international terrorism and superpower unilateralism, many believe that their chances for living good lives depend at least as much on processes that trespass the borders of territorial states as on those contained within them.

Under these conditions, the Keynesian-Westphalian frame no longer goes without saying. For many, it has ceased to be axiomatic that the modern territorial state is the appropriate unit for thinking about issues of justice, and that the citizens of such states are the pertinent subjects of reference. The effect is to destabilize the previous structure of political claims-making—and therefore to change the way we argue about social justice.

This is true for both major families of justice claims. In today’s world, claims for redistribution increasingly eschew the assumption of national economies. Faced with transnationalized production, the outsourcing of jobs, and the associated pressures of the ‘race to the bottom’, once nationally focused labour unions look increasingly for allies abroad. Inspired by the Zapatistas, meanwhile, impoverished peasants and indigenous peoples link their struggles against despotic local and national authorities to critiques of transnational corporate predation and global neoliberalism. Finally, wto protestors directly target the new governance structures of the global economy, which have vastly strengthened the ability of large corporations and investors to escape the regulatory and taxation powers of territorial states.

In the same way, movements struggling for recognition increasingly look beyond the territorial state. Under the umbrella slogan ‘women’s rights are human rights’, for example, feminists throughout the world are linking struggles against local patriarchal practices to campaigns to reform international law. Meanwhile, religious and ethnic minorities, who face discrimination within territorial states, are reconstituting themselves as diasporas and building transnational publics from which to mobilize international opinion. Finally, transnational coalitions of human-rights activists are seeking to build new cosmopolitan institutions, such as the International Criminal Court, which can punish state violations of human dignity.

In such cases, disputes about justice are exploding the Keynesian-Westphalian frame. No longer addressed exclusively to national states or debated exclusively by national publics, claimants no longer focus solely on relations among fellow citizens. Thus, the grammar of argument has altered. Whether the issue is distribution or recognition, disputes that used to focus exclusively on the question of what is owed as a matter of justice to community members now turn quickly into disputes about who should count as a member and which is the relevant community. Not just the ‘what’ but also the ‘who’ is up for grabs.

Today, in other words, arguments about justice assume a double guise. On the one hand, they concern first-order questions of substance, just as before. How much economic inequality does justice permit, how much redistribution is required, and according to which principle of distributive justice? What constitutes equal respect, which kinds of differences merit public recognition, and by which means? But above and beyond such first-order questions, arguments about justice today also concern second-order, meta-level questions. What is the proper frame within which to consider first-order questions of justice? Who are the relevant subjects entitled to a just distribution or reciprocal recognition in the given case? Thus, it is not only the substance of justice, but also the frame, which is in dispute. The result is a major challenge to our theories of social justice. Preoccupied largely with first-order issues of distribution and/or recognition, these theories have so far failed to develop conceptual resources for reflecting on the meta-issue of the frame. As things stand, therefore, it is by no means clear that they are capable of addressing the double character of problems of justice in a globalizing age.footnote4

In this essay, I shall propose a strategy for thinking about the problem of the frame. I shall argue, first, that theories of justice must become three-dimensional, incorporating the political dimension of representation alongside the economic dimension of distribution and the cultural dimension of recognition. I shall also argue that the political dimension of representation should itself be understood as encompassing three levels. The combined effect of these two arguments will be to make visible a third question, beyond those of the ‘what’ and the ‘who’, which I shall call the question of the ‘how’. That question, in turn, inaugurates a paradigm shift: what the Keynesian-Westphalian frame cast as the theory of social justice must now become a theory of post-Westphalian democratic justice.

Specificity of the political

Let me begin by explaining what I mean by justice in general and by its political dimension in particular. In my view, the most general meaning of justice is parity of participation. According to this radical-democratic interpretation of the principle of equal moral worth, justice requires social arrangements that permit all to participate as peers in social life. Overcoming injustice means dismantling institutionalized obstacles that prevent some people from participating on a par with others, as full partners in social interaction. Previously, I have analysed two distinct kinds of obstacles to participatory parity, which correspond to two distinct species of injustice. On the one hand, people can be impeded from full participation by economic structures that deny them the resources they need in order to interact with others as peers; in that case they suffer from distributive injustice or maldistribution. On the other hand, people can also be prevented from interacting on terms of parity by institutionalized hierarchies of cultural value that deny them the requisite standing; in that case they suffer from status inequality or misrecognition.footnote5 In the first case, the problem is the class structure of society, which corresponds to the economic dimension of justice. In the second case, the problem is the status order, which corresponds to its cultural dimension. In modern capitalist societies, the class structure and the status order do not neatly mirror each other, although they interact causally. Rather, each has some autonomy vis-à-vis the other. As a result, misrecognition cannot be reduced to a secondary effect of maldistribution, as some economistic theories of distributive justice appear to suppose. Nor, conversely, can maldistribution be reduced to an epiphenomenal expression of misrecognition, as some culturalist theories of recognition tend to assume. Thus, neither recognition theory nor distribution theory alone can provide an adequate understanding of justice for capitalist society. Only a two-dimensional theory, encompassing both distribution and recognition, can supply the necessary levels of social-theoretical complexity and moral-philosophical insight.footnote6

That, at least, is the view of justice I have defended in the past. And this two-dimensional understanding of justice still seems right to me as far as it goes. But I now believe that it does not go far enough. Distribution and recognition could appear to constitute the sole dimensions of justice only so long as the Keynesian-Westphalian frame was taken for granted. Once the question of the frame becomes subject to contestation, the effect is to make visible a third dimension of justice, which was neglected in my previous work—as well as in the work of many other philosophers.footnote7

The third dimension of justice is the political. Of course, distribution and recognition are themselves political in the sense of being contested and power-laden; and they have usually been seen as requiring adjudication by the state. But I mean political in a more specific, constitutive sense, which concerns the nature of the state’s jurisdiction and the decision rules by which it structures contestation. The political in this sense furnishes the stage on which struggles over distribution and recognition are played out. Establishing criteria of social belonging, and thus determining who counts as a member, the political dimension of justice specifies the reach of those other dimensions: it tells us who is included in, and who excluded from, the circle of those entitled to a just distribution and reciprocal recognition. Establishing decision rules, the political dimension likewise sets the procedures for staging and resolving contests in both the economic and the cultural dimensions: it tells us not only who can make claims for redistribution and recognition, but also how such claims are to be mooted and adjudicated.

Centred on issues of membership and procedure, the political dimension of justice is concerned chiefly with representation. At one level, which pertains to the boundary-setting aspect of the political, representation is a matter of social belonging. What is at issue here is inclusion in, or exclusion from, the community of those entitled to make justice claims on one another. At another level, which pertains to the decision-rule aspect, representation concerns the procedures that structure public processes of contestation. Here, what is at issue are the terms on which those included in the political community air their claims and adjudicate their disputes.footnote8 At both levels, the question can arise as to whether the relations of representation are just. One can ask: do the boundaries of the political community wrongly exclude some who are actually entitled to representation? Do the community’s decision rules accord equal voice in public deliberations and fair representation in public decision-making to all members? Such issues of representation are specifically political. Conceptually distinct from both economic and cultural questions, they cannot be reduced to the latter, although, as we shall see, they are inextricably interwoven with them.

To say that the political is a conceptually distinct dimension of justice, not reducible to the economic or the cultural, is also to say that it can give rise to a conceptually distinct species of injustice. Given the view of justice as participatory parity, this means that there can be distinctively political obstacles to parity, not reducible to maldistribution or misrecognition, although (again) interwoven with them. Such obstacles arise from the political constitution of society, as opposed to the class structure or status order. Grounded in a specifically political mode of social ordering, they can only be adequately grasped through a theory that conceptualizes representation, along with distribution and recognition, as one of three fundamental dimensions of justice.

Three levels of misrepresentation

If representation is the defining issue of the political, then the characteristic political injustice is misrepresentation. Misrepresentation occurs when political boundaries and/or decision rules function to deny some people, wrongly, the possibility of participating on a par with others in social interaction—including, but not only, in political arenas. Far from being reducible to maldistribution or misrecognition, misrepresentation can occur even in the absence of the latter injustices, although it is usually intertwined with them. At least two different levels of misrepresentation can be distinguished. Insofar as political decision rules wrongly deny some of the included the chance to participate fully, as peers, the injustice is what I call ordinary-political misrepresentation. Here, where the issue is intra-frame representation, we enter the familiar terrain of political science debates over the relative merits of alternative electoral systems. Do single-member-district, winner-take-all, first-past-the-post systems unjustly deny parity to numerical minorities? And if so, is proportional representation or cumulative voting the appropriate remedy? Likewise, do gender-blind rules, in conjunction with gender-based maldistribution and misrecognition, function to deny parity of political participation to women? And if so, are gender quotas an appropriate remedy? Such questions belong to the sphere of ordinary-political justice, which has usually been played out within the Keynesian-Westphalian frame.

Less obvious, perhaps, is a second level of misrepresentation, which concerns the boundary-setting aspect of the political. Here the injustice arises when the community’s boundaries are drawn in such a way as to wrongly exclude some people from the chance to participate at all in its authorized contests over justice. In such cases, misrepresentation takes a deeper form, which I shall call misframing. The deeper character of misframing is a function of the crucial importance of framing to every question of social justice. Far from being of marginal significance, frame-setting is among the most consequential of political decisions. Constituting both members and non-members in a single stroke, this decision effectively excludes the latter from the universe of those entitled to consideration within the community in matters of distribution, recognition, and ordinary-political representation. The result can be a serious injustice. When questions of justice are framed in a way that wrongly excludes some from consideration, the consequence is a special kind of meta-injustice, in which one is denied the chance to press first-order justice claims in a given political community. The injustice remains, moreover, even when those excluded from one political community are included as subjects of justice in another—as long as the effect of the political division is to put some relevant aspects of justice beyond their reach. Still more serious, of course, is the case in which one is excluded from membership in any political community. Akin to the loss of what Hannah Arendt called ‘the right to have rights’, that sort of misframing is a kind of ‘political death’.footnote9 Those who suffer it may become objects of charity or benevolence. But deprived of the possibility of authoring first-order claims, they become non-persons with respect to justice.

It is the misframing form of misrepresentation that globalization has recently begun to make visible. Earlier, in the heyday of the postwar welfare state, with the Keynesian-Westphalian frame securely in place, the principal concern in thinking about justice was distribution. Later, with the rise of the new social movements and multiculturalism, the centre of gravity shifted to recognition. In both cases, the modern territorial state was assumed by default. As a result, the political dimension of justice was relegated to the margins. Where it did emerge, it took the ordinary-political form of contests over the decision rules internal to the polity, whose boundaries were taken for granted. Thus, claims for gender quotas and multicultural rights sought to remove political obstacles to participatory parity for those who were already included in principle in the political community. Taking for granted the Keynesian-Westphalian frame, they did not call into question the assumption that the appropriate unit of justice was the territorial state.

Today, in contrast, globalization has put the question of the frame squarely on the political agenda. Increasingly subject to contestation, the Keynesian-Westphalian frame is now considered by many to be a major vehicle of injustice, as it partitions political space in ways that block many who are poor and despised from challenging the forces that oppress them. Channelling their claims into the domestic political spaces of relatively powerless, if not wholly failed, states, this frame insulates offshore powers from critique and control.footnote10 Among those shielded from the reach of justice are more powerful predator states and transnational private powers, including foreign investors and creditors, international currency speculators, and transnational corporations. Also protected are the governance structures of the global economy, which set exploitative terms of interaction and then exempt them from democratic control. Finally, the Keynesian-Westphalian frame is self-insulating; the architecture of the interstate system protects the very partitioning of political space that it institutionalizes, effectively excluding transnational democratic decision-making on issues of justice.

From this perspective, the Keynesian-Westphalian frame is a powerful instrument of injustice, which gerrymanders political space at the expense of the poor and despised. For those persons who are denied the chance to press transnational first-order claims, struggles against maldistribution and misrecognition cannot proceed, let alone succeed, unless they are joined with struggles against misframing. It is not surprising, therefore, that some consider misframing the defining injustice of a globalizing age. Under these conditions, the political dimension of justice is hard to ignore. Insofar as globalization is politicizing the question of the frame, it is also making visible an aspect of the grammar of justice that was often neglected in the previous period. It is now apparent that no claim for justice can avoid presupposing some notion of representation, implicit or explicit, insofar as none can avoid assuming a frame. Thus, representation is always already inherent in all claims for redistribution and recognition. The political dimension is implicit in, indeed required by, the grammar of the concept of justice. Thus, no redistribution or recognition without representation.footnote11

In general, then, an adequate theory of justice for our time must be three-dimensional. Encompassing not only redistribution and recognition, but also representation, it must allow us to grasp the question of the frame as a question of justice. Incorporating the economic, cultural and political dimensions, it must enable us to identify injustices of misframing and to evaluate possible remedies. Above all, it must permit us to pose, and to answer, the key political question of our age: how can we integrate struggles against maldistribution, misrecognition and misrepresentation within a post-Westphalian frame?

## Adv 1

### Innovation Adv---1NC

#### No patent holdups---they require empirical evidence---Shapiro is a hack

Trevor Soames 16. Competition/regulatory lawyer + litigator (Avocat au Barreau de Bruxelles, Solicitor-Advocate & Barrister). "PATENT HOLD UP: “The fallacies of patent hold up theory” ". No Publication. 11-13-2016. https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/patent-hold-up-fallacies-theory-trevor-soames

The theory of Patent Holdup remains remarkably devoid of any empirical evidence. The paper delivered by Prof Carl Shapiro, one of the key proponents of that theory, at IEEE in late 2015 did nothing to fill that void, arguing that such evidence was unnecessary as it can be inferred just like, others have argued, like “dark matter”. As posted previously, a link to a copy of this still unpublished paper can be found embedded in the following commentary by Keith Mallinson:

http://www.wiseharbor.com/pdfs/Mallinson%20on%20Holdup%20and%20Holdout%20for%20IP%20Finance%2016%20Aug%202016.pdf

Before moving on to the newly published paper, I would like to point out, in all fairness, that the paper does indeed cite what it claims to be the "leading example" of hold up, namely the notorious General Motors/Fisher Body transaction. However, that so called example has been shown - in thoroughly researched papers - such as the one cited below by Professor Dan Spulber et al, but there are others, to have been wholly based upon a recitation of false facts. More detail on this flawed example can be found at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=231736 In other words, General Motors/Fisher Body is simply not a real and viable example of hold up, as claimed.

If you have an interest in this issue which has guided antitrust enforcement policies in many jurisdictions, including my own, then please read this just released paper by my friend Professor Stephen Haber of Stanford: http://hooverip2.org/working-paper/wp16009/ http://hooverip2.org/wp-content/uploads/ip2-wp16009-paper-1.pdf

In that paper both he and his co author, Alex Galetovic, examine each of the pillars that support the theory of Patent Holdup and find them (seriously) wanting. They find that the theory is based on three sequential fallacies: 1) patent holdup is a straightforward variant of holdup as it is understood in transaction cost economics; 2) royalty stacking is holdup repeated multiple times on the same product; 3) standard essential patents contribute little or no value to the markets they help create. These fallacies give rise to a theory that is logically inconsistent, incomplete, and ignores economic fundamentals. The flaws in logic of Patent Holdup Theory, and its lack of fit with the evidence, suggests that a new theory about the mechanics and dynamics of SEP-intensive IT industries is called for, both as a matter of science and as a guide to antitrust and patent policies.

#### The 1AC doesn’t have a card that any of the firms they let into the market have the resources to innovate---that was CX.

#### Plan causes patent holdouts---that outweighs holdups.

Keith Mallinson 16. Founder of WiseHarbor, providing expert commercial consultancy since 2007 to technology and service businesses in wired and wireless telecommunications, media and entertainment serving consumer and professional markets. He is an industry expert and consultant with 25 years of experience and extensive knowledge of the ICT industries and markets, including the IP-rich 2G/3G/4G mobile communications sector. His clients include several major companies in ICT. He is often engaged as a testifying expert witness in patent licensing agreement disputes and in other litigation including asset valuations, damages assessments and in antitrust cases. He is also a regular columnist with FierceWireless and IP Finance. “Mallinson on Patent Holdup and Holdout: for IP Finance 16th August 2016”. https://www.wiseharbor.com/pdfs/Mallinson%20on%20Holdup%20and%20Holdout%20for%20IP%20Finance%2016%20Aug%202016.pdf

“Patent holdup” allegations encourage SEP free-riders

Despite many years of speculation and recently adjusted claims, there is no empirical support for the theory of “patent holdup.” Various eminent experts refute allegations of systemic “patent holdup.” It is likely that “patent holdup” has not occurred in the context of standards and licensing of standards essential patents (SEPs) because of the fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) licensing contracts and available recourse to the courts have ensured that licensees cannot be forced to pay “excessive” licensing fees.

“Patent holdout,” which is also sometimes referred to as “reverse holdup,“ rather than “patent holdup” may instead be a prevalent problem; although calls for remedies have largely been in response to “patent holdup” allegations. Beguiled courts, antitrust authorities, government policy makers and even a standards development organisation (SDO) are tipping the scales in favour of “patent holdout” by infringing implementers of SEPs. This is destabilising the equilibrium between the interests of the licensors and licensees forged by consensus over decades in the IPR policies of SDOs such as ETSI with Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory licensing. As leading academics note, “FRAND Implies Balance” and “FRAND [is not] a one-way street.” Whereas alleged “patent holdup” supposedly results in excessive royalties, “patent holdout” is undermining licensors attempts even to achieve FRAND terms or to complete any licensing at all in many cases. Licensors are therefore losing their ability to make a fair return on their investments in SEP technologies. This discourages ongoing investments in standard-essential technologies, participation in SDOs and contribution to the standards.

#### Antitrust in IP hammers innovation, especially in American 5G.

Abbott ’21 [Alden Abbott, Paul Redmond Michel, Adam Mossoff, Kristen Jakobsen Osenga, and Brian O’Shaughnessy; March 10; the Federal Trade Commission’s General Counsel (2018-2021), adjunct professor at George Mason University, J.D. from Harvard Law School, M.A. in economics from Georgetown University; Retired Chief Judge and United States Circuit Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit; Law Professor at George Mason University; Law Professor at the University of Richmond; chair of Dinsmore’s IP Transactions and Licensing Group; the Regulatory Transparency Project, “Aligning Intellectual Property, Antitrust, and National Security Policy,” https://regproject.org/wp-content/uploads/Paper-Aligning-Intellectual-Property-Antitrust-and-National-Security-Policy.pdf]

Although much of the excitement about 5G wireless technology focuses on how it will improve every aspect of our lives – from smart homes to smart cities, from healthcare to food to business to entertainment – this technology is also critical for an often-invisible, but even more critical, application: national security. 5G is a vast improvement over existing mobile technology, with massively increased speeds of data transfer and other enhanced capacities. The benefits this unprecedented speed and capacity will have for the United States military include improved surveillance and reconnaissance systems, new and more accurate methods of command and control, and integrated and streamlined logistics systems for increased efficiency.1 On the other hand, the same technological advancements facilitated by 5G technology may also give rise to new cybersecurity vulnerabilities.

Although it is the future of everything, 5G does not pose a potential problem in some far-off future. Today, the U.S. is already depending on a wide array of 5G technology suppliers for its national security system. For example, the national security programs of the Department of Defense (DOD) rely on continued access to telecommunication products made by companies with security clearance on a range of active classified and unclassified prime government contracts.2 Devices that rely on such wireless technology include those used to command troops in combat, control drones, target smart munitions, and perform other vital military functions.3 Allied partnerships with the U.S. also depend on its efforts to address cybersecurity in the next generation of wireless, 5G, and Internet of things.4

To ensure the safety of the systems on which the U.S. military relies and avoid unknown and unexpected cybersecurity vulnerabilities, the U.S. must remain an active and competitive participant in 5G development. Antitrust policies that undermine the intellectual property rights of U.S. innovators will diminish U.S. companies’ ability to invest in research and development (R&D) and to compete in the global 5G ecosystem. Even more important than increased economic growth, new jobs, and enhanced daily lives, these antitrust policies must be changed for the sake of U.S. national security.

#### Unpredictable legal shifts wreck business confidence---turns decline.

Sarah Chaney Cambon 21, Reporter on The Wall Street Journal's Economics Team, BA in Business Journalism from the University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill, “Capital-Spending Surge Further Lifts Economic Recovery”, Wall Street Journal, 6/27/2021, https://www.wsj.com/articles/capital-spending-surge-further-lifts-economic-recovery-11624798800

Business investment is emerging as a powerful source of U.S. economic growth that will likely help sustain the recovery.

Companies are ramping up orders for computers, machinery and software as they grow more confident in the outlook.

Nonresidential fixed investment, a proxy for business spending, rose at a seasonally adjusted annual rate of 11.7% in the first quarter, led by growth in software and tech-equipment spending, according to the Commerce Department. Business investment also logged double-digit gains in the third and fourth quarters last year after falling during pandemic-related shutdowns. It is now higher than its pre-pandemic peak.

Orders for nondefense capital goods excluding aircraft, another measure for business investment, are near the highest levels for records tracing back to the 1990s, separate Commerce Department figures show.

“Business investment has really been an important engine powering the U.S. economic recovery,” said Robert Rosener, senior U.S. economist at Morgan Stanley. “In our outlook for the economy, it’s certainly one of the bright spots.”

Consumer spending, which accounts for about two-thirds of economic output, is driving the early stages of the recovery. Americans, flush with savings and government stimulus checks, are spending more on goods and services, which they shunned for much of the pandemic.

Robust capital investment will be key to ensuring that the recovery maintains strength after the spending boost from fiscal stimulus and business reopenings eventually fades, according to some economists.

Rising business investment helps fuel economic output. It also lifts worker productivity, or output per hour. That metric grew at a sluggish pace throughout the last economic expansion but is now showing signs of resurgence.

The recovery in business investment is shaping up to be much stronger than in the years following the 2007-09 recession. “The events especially in late ’08, early ’09 put a lot of businesses really close to the edge,” said Phil Suttle, founder of Suttle Economics. “I think a lot of them said, ‘We’ve just got to be really cautious for a long while.’”

Businesses appear to be less risk-averse now, he said.

After the financial crisis, businesses grew by adding workers, rather than investing in capital. Hiring was more attractive than capital spending because labor was abundant and relatively cheap. Now the supply of workers is tight. Companies are raising pay to lure employees. As a result, many firms have more incentive to grow by investing in capital.

Economists at Morgan Stanley predict that U.S. capital spending will rise to 116% of prerecession levels after three years. By comparison, investment took 10 years to reach those levels once the 2007-09 recession hit.

Company executives are increasingly confident in the economy’s trajectory. The Business Roundtable’s economic-outlook index—a composite of large companies’ plans for hiring and spending, as well as sales projections—increased by nine points in the second quarter to 116, just below 2018’s record high, according to a survey conducted between May 25 and June 9. In the second quarter, the share of companies planning to boost capital investment increased to 59% from 57% in the first.

“We’re seeing really strong reopening demand, and a lot of times capital investment follows that,” said Joe Song, senior U.S. economist at BofA Securities.

Mr. Song added that less uncertainty regarding trade tensions between the U.S. and China should further underpin business confidence and investment. “At the very least, businesses will understand the strategy that the Biden administration is trying to follow and will be able to plan around that,” he said.

#### Innovation fails

Bee 18 [Vanessa A. Bee. Senior Litigation Counsel at the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau with a JD from Harvard Law. Innovation Under Socialism. 10-24-2018. <https://www.currentaffairs.org/2018/10/innovation-under-socialism> ]

But prioritizing profit is a double-edged sword that can hamper innovation. Owning the proprietary rights allows private firms to block workers—through anti-competitive tools like non-compete agreements, patents, and licenses—who put labor into the innovation process from applying the extensive technical expertise and intimate understanding of the product to improve the innovation substantially. This becomes especially relevant once the workers leave the firm division in which they worked, or leave the firm altogether. Understandably, this lack of control and ownership will cause some workers, however passionate they may be about a project, to be less willing to maximize their contribution to the innovation. Of course, the so-called nimbleness that allows firms to make drastic changes like mass layoffs is extremely harmful to the workers. This is no fluke. The capitalist economy thrives on a reserve army of labor. Inching closer to full employment makes workers scarcer, which empowers the labor force as a whole to bargain for higher wages and better work conditions. These threaten the firm’s bottom line. So, the capitalist economy is structured to maintain the balance of power towards the owners of capital. Positions that pay well (and less than well) come with the precariousness of at-will employment and disappearing union power. A constant pool of unemployed labor is maintained through layoffs and other tactics like higher interest rates, which the government will compel to help slow growth and thereby hiring. This system harms the potential for innovation, too. The fear of losing work can dissuade workers from taking risks, experimenting, or speaking up as they identify items that could improve a taken approach—all actions that foster innovation. Meanwhile, thousands of individuals who could be contributing to the innovative process are instead involuntarily un-employed. This model also encourages monopolization, as concentrating market power gives private firms the most control over how much profit they can extract. But squashing competition that could contribute fresh ideas hurts every phase of the innovation process, while giving workers in fewer workplaces space to innovate. Deferring to profit causes many areas of R&D to go unexplored. Private firms have less reason to invest in innovations likely to be made universally available for free if managers or investors do not see much upside for the firm’s bottom line. In theory, the slack in private research can be picked up by the public sector. In reality, however, decades of austerity measures threaten the public’s ability to underwrite risky and inefficient research. Both the Democratic and Republican parties increasingly adhere to a neoliberal ideology that vilifies “big government,” promotes running government like a business, pretends that government budgets should mirror household budgets or the private firm’s balance sheet, and rams privatization under the guises of so-called public-private partnerships and private subcontractors. In the United States, public investment in R&D has been trending downward. As documented in a 2014 report from the Information Technology & Innovation Foundation, “[f]rom 2010 to 2013, federal R&D spending fell from $158.8 to $133.2 billion … Between 2003 and 2008, state funding for university research, as a share of GDP, dropped on average by 2 percent. States such as Arizona and Utah saw decreases of 49 percent and 24 percent respectively.” Even if public investment in the least profitable aspect of research suddenly surged, in our current model, the private sector continues to be the primary driver of development, production, and distribution. Where there remains little potential for profit, private firms will be reluctant to advance to the next phases of the innovation process. Public-private projects raise similar concerns. Coordinated efforts can increase private investment by spreading some costs and risk to the public. But to attract private partners in the first place, the public sector has a greater incentive to prioritize R&D projects with more financial upsides. This is how the quest for profits and tight grip over proprietary rights, both important features of the capitalist model, discourage risk. Innovations are bound for plateauing after a few years, as firms increasingly favor minor aesthetic tweaks and updates over bold ideas while preventing other avenues of innovation from blossoming. At the same time, massive amounts of capital continue to float into the hands of a few. The price of innovating under capitalism is then both decreased innovation and decreased equality. The idea that this approach to innovation must be our best and only option is a delusion.

#### No econ decline impact.

Stephen M. Walt 20. Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University. "Will a Global Depression Trigger Another World War?" Foreign Policy. 5-13-2020. https://foreignpolicy-com.proxy.library.emory.edu/2020/05/13/coronavirus-pandemic-depression-economy-world-war/

On balance, however, I do not think that even the extraordinary economic conditions we are witnessing today are going to have much impact on the likelihood of war. Why? First of all, if depressions were a powerful cause of war, there would be a lot more of the latter. To take one example, the United States has suffered 40 or more recessions since the country was founded, yet it has fought perhaps 20 interstate wars, most of them unrelated to the state of the economy. To paraphrase the economist Paul Samuelson’s famous quip about the stock market, if recessions were a powerful cause of war, they would have predicted “nine out of the last five (or fewer).”

Second, states do not start wars unless they believe they will win a quick and relatively cheap victory. As John Mearsheimer showed in his classic book Conventional Deterrence, national leaders avoid war when they are convinced it will be long, bloody, costly, and uncertain. To choose war, political leaders have to convince themselves they can either win a quick, cheap, and decisive victory or achieve some limited objective at low cost. Europe went to war in 1914 with each side believing it would win a rapid and easy victory, and Nazi Germany developed the strategy of blitzkrieg in order to subdue its foes as quickly and cheaply as possible. Iraq attacked Iran in 1980 because Saddam believed the Islamic Republic was in disarray and would be easy to defeat, and George W. Bush invaded Iraq in 2003 convinced the war would be short, successful, and pay for itself.

The fact that each of these leaders miscalculated badly does not alter the main point: No matter what a country’s economic condition might be, its leaders will not go to war unless they think they can do so quickly, cheaply, and with a reasonable probability of success.

Third, and most important, the primary motivation for most wars is the desire for security, not economic gain. For this reason, the odds of war increase when states believe the long-term balance of power may be shifting against them, when they are convinced that adversaries are unalterably hostile and cannot be accommodated, and when they are confident they can reverse the unfavorable trends and establish a secure position if they act now. The historian A.J.P. Taylor once observed that “every war between Great Powers [between 1848 and 1918] … started as a preventive war, not as a war of conquest,” and that remains true of most wars fought since then.

The bottom line: Economic conditions (i.e., a depression) may affect the broader political environment in which decisions for war or peace are made, but they are only one factor among many and rarely the most significant. Even if the COVID-19 pandemic has large, lasting, and negative effects on the world economy—as seems quite likely—it is not likely to affect the probability of war very much, especially in the short term.

## Adv 2

### Cybersecurity Adv---1NC

#### They only require companies to license their patents---that doesn’t solve monocultured software---it still uses the same standards, so it’s still vulnerable to cyberattacks.

#### No cyber impact.

James Andrew Lewis 20. Senior vice president and director of the Strategic Technologies Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “Dismissing Cyber Catastrophe”. 8-17-2018. https://www.csis.org/analysis/dismissing-cyber-catastrophe

More importantly, there are powerful strategic constraints on those who have the ability to launch catastrophe attacks. We have more than two decades of experience with the use of cyber techniques and operations for coercive and criminal purposes and have a clear understanding of motives, capabilities, and intentions. We can be guided by the methods of the Strategic Bombing Survey, which used interviews and observation (rather than hypotheses) to determine effect. These methods apply equally to cyberattacks. The conclusions we can draw from this are:

Nonstate actors and most states lack the capability to launch attacks that cause physical damage at any level, much less a catastrophe. There have been regular predictions every year for over a decade that nonstate actors will acquire these high-end cyber capabilities in two or three years in what has become a cycle of repetition. The monetary return is negligible, which dissuades the skilled cybercriminals (mostly Russian speaking) who might have the necessary skills. One mystery is why these groups have not been used as mercenaries, and this may reflect either a degree of control by the Russian state (if it has forbidden mercenary acts) or a degree of caution by criminals.

There is enough uncertainty among potential attackers about the United States’ ability to attribute that they are unwilling to risk massive retaliation in response to a catastrophic attack. (They are perfectly willing to take the risk of attribution for espionage and coercive cyber actions.)

No one has ever died from a cyberattack, and only a handful of these attacks have produced physical damage. A cyberattack is not a nuclear weapon, and it is intellectually lazy to equate them to nuclear weapons. Using a tactical nuclear weapon against an urban center would produce several hundred thousand casualties, while a strategic nuclear exchange would cause tens of millions of casualties and immense physical destruction. These are catastrophes that some hack cannot duplicate. The shadow of nuclear war distorts discussion of cyber warfare.

State use of cyber operations is consistent with their broad national strategies and interests. Their primary emphasis is on espionage and political coercion. The United States has opponents and is in conflict with them, but they have no interest in launching a catastrophic cyberattack since it would certainly produce an equally catastrophic retaliation. Their goal is to stay below the “use-of-force” threshold and undertake damaging cyber actions against the United States, not start a war.

This has implications for the discussion of inadvertent escalation, something that has also never occurred. The concern over escalation deserves a longer discussion, as there are both technological and strategic constraints that shape and limit risk in cyber operations, and the absence of inadvertent escalation suggests a high degree of control for cyber capabilities by advanced states. Attackers, particularly among the United States’ major opponents for whom cyber is just one of the tools for confrontation, seek to avoid actions that could trigger escalation.

The United States has two opponents (China and Russia) who are capable of damaging cyberattacks. Russia has demonstrated its attack skills on the Ukrainian power grid, but neither Russia nor China would be well served by a similar attack on the United States. Iran is improving and may reach the point where it could use cyberattacks to cause major damage, but it would only do so when it has decided to engage in a major armed conflict with the United States. Iran might attack targets outside the United States and its allies with less risk and continues to experiment with cyberattacks against Israeli critical infrastructure. North Korea has not yet developed this kind of capability.

#### No impact to the grid.

Jesse Dunietz & Robert M. Lee 17. \*Scientific American's 2017 AAAS Mass Media fellow, and a Ph.D. candidate in computer science at Carnegie Mellon University. \*CEO of industrial cybersecurity firm Dragos. “Is the Power Grid Getting More Vulnerable to Cyber Attacks?” Scientific American. 2017. <https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/is-the-power-grid-getting-more-vulnerable-to-cyber-attacks/>

Two weeks ago it was cyberattacks on the Irish power grid. Last month it was a digital assault on U.S. energy companies, including a nuclear power plant. Back in December a Russian hack of a Vermont utility was all over the news. From the media buzz, one might conclude that power grid infrastructure is teetering on the brink of a hacker-induced meltdown. The real story is more nuanced, however. Scientific American spoke with grid cybersecurity expert Robert M. Lee, CEO of industrial cybersecurity firm Dragos, Inc., to sort out fact from hype. Dragos, which aims to protect critical infrastructure from cyberattacks, recently raised $10 million from investors to further its mission. Before he founded the company, Lee worked for the U.S. government analyzing and defending against cyberattacks on infrastructure. For a portion of his military career, he also worked on the government’s offensive front. His work has given him a front-row view on both sides of infrastructure cybersecurity. [An edited transcript of the interview follows.] How concerned should we be about grid and infrastructure cybersecurity, and what should we be most worried about? The electric grid and most infrastructure we have is actually fairly well built for reliability and safety. We’ve had a strong safety culture in industrial engineering for decades. That safety and reliability has never been thought of from a cybersecurity perspective, but it has afforded us a very defensible environment. As an example: if a portion of the U.S. power grid goes down. We usually anticipate those things for hurricanes or winter-weather storms. And we’re good at moving away from the computers and doing manual operations, just working the infrastructure to get it back. Usually it’s hours, maybe days; never more than a week or so. A lot of these cyberattacks deal with the computer technology and the interconnected nature of the infrastructure. And so when they target it in that way, you’re talking hours, maybe a day, at most a week of disruption. For reasonable scenarios, we’re not talking about a long time of outages, and we’re not talking about compromising safety. Now, the scary side of it is [twofold]. One, our adversaries are getting much more aggressive. They’re learning a lot about our industrial systems, not just from a computer technology standpoint but from an industrial engineering standpoint, thinking about how to disrupt or maybe even destroy equipment. That’s where you start reaching some particularly alarming scenarios. The second thing is, a lot of that ability to return to manual operation, the rugged nature of our infrastructure—a lot of that’s changing. Because of business reasons, because of lack of people to man the jobs, we’re starting to see more and more computer-based systems. We’re starting to see more common operating platforms. And this facilitates a scale for adversaries that they couldn’t previously get. When you say our adversaries are getting more aggressive, what are you referring to? The key events are things like the Ukraine attack in 2015–2016, [in which a cyberattack brought down portions of the Ukrainian power grid], as well as two different campaigns in 2013–2014, BlackEnergy2 and Havex, [two malware programs that were deployed against energy sector companies]. Basically, far-reaching espionage on industrial facilities one year; the next year getting into industrial environments; and then culmination in attacks in 2015–2016. That’s aggressive in itself. For my own firm, what we’re seeing in the [overall] activity in the space is it’s growing. Over the last decade, I have seen adversary activity increase in some measure, and then around 2013–2014 just start spiking. What are the adversaries actually doing in these attacks? [There are two broad categories of attacks.] Stage I intrusions are those designed to gain information. These are the traditional espionage efforts we’ve become accustomed to hearing about, where information is stolen or deleted. A Stage II attack could result in temporary loss of power, physical damage to equipment, or other types of scenarios we often hear about. It is important to note these are not trivial to accomplish. If an attacker wants to progress to a Stage II attack, during the Stage I intrusion they have to steal information specific to [that] industrial environment. The 2013–2014 campaigns that I mentioned were exactly the kinds of Stage I activity that you’d want to use to pivot into a Stage II activity. And so they scared the heck out of all of us. But the stuff we’ve heard about recently—the nuclear site and about a dozen energy companies that were compromised in a phishing campaign that made the news—none of that sounded tailored toward pivoting into a Stage II. Once an adversary has broken into the “business networks” used for email, documents and so on, how far a jump is it for them to access the industrial control system (ICS) networks used to control and monitor the industrial equipment? In nuclear environments, [business networks and control networks are] airgapped—[i.e., computers on one network cannot talk to those on the other]—because of safety regulations. The idea that because you got into the business network you can easily move into the ICS network is ridiculous. That is not true with other industrial infrastructures—electric energy, oil and gas, manufacturing, etc. You absolutely have [ICS] networks that are connected up. The nuance here is that we have a joke in the community: you’ll get security folks who don’t know much about ICS coming in with penetration testers and saying, “Oh my gosh, I found so many vulnerabilities!” And so the joke is, why don’t I just sit you down at the terminal? I will give you 100 percent access. Now make the lights blink. There’s a big gap there. [So the challenge is] not so much getting access. It’s once you get access, do you know what to do in a way that’s not just going to be embarrassing? What motivation do these adversaries have to attack the U.S. grid? I do not feel that there is a legitimate reason for adversaries to disrupt or destroy industrial infrastructure outside of a conflict scenario. Ukraine and Russia is a great example. I don’t necessarily mean declared war, but in places where we see conflict, I think we’ll see industrial attacks: North Korea-South Korea, China-Taiwan. But there are some scenarios that concern me, where we might have our hands forced and not have clarity around what happened. I’m aware of at least one case where a skilled adversary broke into an industrial environment, and in the course of intelligence operations they accidentally knocked over some sensitive system that led to visible destruction and almost to multiple casualties. And the worst part is, we didn’t actually realize it was a failed operation until about a month after, because the forensics and analysis take time. So you could have a scenario where the U.S., Russia, China, Iran—big players—are doing intelligence operations on each other, are doing pre-positioning to have deterrence or political leverage, and mess up that operation in a way that looks like an attack that we do not have transparency on for some time. We do not have international norms around how to handle that. Outside of conflict scenarios, though, I don’t see the advantage to [deliberate] disruptive or destructive attacks. I think we haven’t seen it not because they haven’t wanted to, but because the return on investment is minimal. What’s really advantageous is sitting U.S. congressmen and policymakers fearing what can happen with industrial infrastructure. That fear drives policy far more than actually turning the lights off and having them realize [they will] come back on in six hours.

# 2NC

#### 2. Evaluate political imaginaries---the ballot should affirm the most desirable one. Debates over cosmopolitanism shape subjectivity---their model re-instantiates meta-norms that teach debaters to recreate the nation-state’s violence through social practices.

Gerard Delanty 14. Professor of Sociology and Social Political Thought (School of Law, Politics and Sociology) @ University of Sussex, UK “The prospects of cosmopolitanism and the possibility of global justice.” Journal of Sociology 2014, Vol. 50(2) 213–228 https://www.sciencespo.fr/ceri/plurispace/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/DELANTY\_Prospects-Cosmopolitanism.pdf

It is in the first instance a condition of openness to the world in the sense of the broadening of the moral and political horizon of societies. It entails a view of societies as connected rather than separated. Cosmopolitanism is made possible by the fact that individuals, groups, publics, societies have a capacity for learning in dealing with problems and, in particular, learning from each other. In this sense, then, cosmopolitanism is not a matter of diversity or mobility, but a process of learning. Dialogue is a key feature of cosmopolitanism since dialogue opens up the possibility of incorporating the perspective of others into one’s own view of the world. It can thus be associated with a communicative view of modernity. Rather than being an affirmative condition, it is transformative and is produced by social struggles rather than being primarily elite driven or entirely institutional. In this sense, cosmopolitanism can be related to popular and vernacular traditions rather than exclusively to the projects of elites (see Holton, 2009). From an epistemological perspective, cosmopolitanism involves the production of essentially critical knowledge, such as the identification of transformative potentials within the present.

Finally, cosmopolitanism is related to subject formation: it is constitutive of the self as much as it is of social and political processes. This is reflected in the von Humboldtian – in this case Wilhelm von Humboldt’s – understanding of cosmopolitanism as a particular kind of consciousness that is best exemplified in education. In the acquisition of knowledge, the self undergoes a transformation, for Bildung is a form of self-formation and occurs through the encounter of the individual with the world. Bildung is a means of encountering the universal, as reflected in the category of the world, and is the aim of education.

These features of cosmopolitanism challenge the received view of normative ideas, such as global justice as transcending political community or as simply utopian. The conception of cosmopolitanism I am putting forward is that it is constitutive of modernity and part of the make-up of political community. This is why cosmopolitanism is not a zero sum condition – either present or absent – as its critics often argue and its defenders mistakenly argue in its support. It is present to varying degrees in contemporary societies.

In order to assess the prospects of cosmopolitanism it is therefore necessary to determine the extent to which cosmopolitan phenomena are present in the cultural model of societies and in their modes of social organization and institutions. By the cultural model, I mean the social imaginary of societies, that is the dominant forms of collective identity or self-understanding. The cultural model of all modern societies involves the amplification and metamorphosis of transcultural ideas such as liberty, justice, freedom, autonomy, rights, which of course are variously interpreted and are not always fully institutionalized. But the existence of such ideas (essentially meta-norms), means that societies have the cognitive means of reaching beyond themselves. For this reason, there is generally a tension in modern societies between the cultural model and institutions. Related to these levels of analysis is the dimension of subject formation, the cosmopolitan self. It is possible that any one time in the history of a society there is a tension between subject formation, the cultural model of society, and social institutions. It is for this reason that cosmopolitanism can be seen as a critical theory of society (see Delanty, 2009): it shares with the critical heritage the concern with possibilities within the present or the immanent transcendence of society.

I am emphasizing, then, the formative dimensions of cosmopolitanism, which in other words is a structure forming itself out of both the self and society. It entails a subject (the cosmopolitan subject), a discourse in which ideas, knowledge, modes of cognition are produced, and social practices. Viewed in such terms, cosmopolitanism is a process as opposed to a fixed condition. It is marked by conflict, contradictions, negotiation. The implications of this view are that evidence of cosmopolitanism must be found not in an end state – a cosmopolitan society or state as opposed to a non-cosmopolitan one – but in the process by which it emerges. It is the task of sociology to determine whether and how this process is occurring.

#### 4. Misrepresentation---predetermining the “who” and “how” of policymaking blocks democratic arenas via political gerrymandering. Our public sphere of argument over the Westphalian frames is an act of justice through assertion of rights.

Nancy Fraser 05. Henry A. and Louise Loeb Professor of Political and Social Science and professor of philosophy at The New School. “Reframing Justice in a Globalizing World, NLR 36, November–December 2005.” New Left Review. https://newleftreview-org.proxy.library.emory.edu/issues/ii36/articles/nancy-fraser-reframing-justice-in-a-globalizing-world

But the claims of transformative politics go further still. Above and beyond their other demands, these movements are also claiming a say in a post-Westphalian process of frame-setting. Rejecting the standard view, which deems frame-setting the prerogative of states and transnational elites, they are effectively aiming to democratize the process by which the frameworks of justice are drawn and revised. Asserting their right to participate in constituting the ‘who’ of justice, they are simultaneously transforming the ‘how’—by which I mean the accepted procedures for determining the ‘who’. At their most reflective and ambitious, accordingly, transformative movements are demanding the creation of new democratic arenas for entertaining arguments about the frame. In some cases, moreover, they are creating such arenas themselves. In the World Social Forum, for example, some practitioners of transformative politics have fashioned a transnational public sphere where they can participate on a par with others in airing and resolving disputes about the frame. In this way, they are prefiguring the possibility of new institutions of post-Westphalian democratic justice.footnote16

The democratizing dimension of transformative politics points to a third level of political injustice, above and beyond the two already discussed. Previously, I distinguished first-order injustices of ordinary-political misrepresentation from second-order injustices of misframing. Now, however, we can discern a third-order species of political injustice, which corresponds to the question of the ‘how’. Exemplified by undemocratic processes of frame-setting, this injustice consists in the failure to institutionalize parity of participation at the meta-political level, in deliberations and decisions concerning the ‘who’. Because what is at stake here is the process by which first-order political space is constituted, I shall call this injustice meta-political misrepresentation. Meta-political misrepresentation arises when states and transnational elites monopolize the activity of frame-setting, denying voice to those who may be harmed in the process, and blocking creation of democratic arenas where the latter’s claims can be vetted and redressed. The effect is to exclude the overwhelming majority of people from participation in the meta-discourses that determine the authoritative division of political space. Lacking any institutional arenas for such participation, and submitted to an undemocratic approach to the ‘how’, the majority is denied the chance to engage on terms of parity in decision-making about the ‘who’.

#### 3. Means only the alt can solve the case.

Nancy Fraser 12. Henry A. and Louise Loeb Professor of Political and Social Science and professor of philosophy at The New School. Can society be commodities all the way down? Polanyian reflections on capitalist crisis. 2012. ffhalshs-00725060f

Today, moreover, as many on the Left have long warned, and as Greeks have discovered to their dismay, the construction of Europe as an economic and monetary union, without corresponding political and fiscal integration, simply disables the protective capacities of member states without creating broader, European-level protective capacities to take up the slack. But that is not all. Absent global financial regulation, even very wealthy, free-standing countries find their efforts at national social protection stymied by global market forces, including transnational corporations, international currency speculators, financiers, and large institutional investors. The globalization of finance requires a new, post-westphalian way of imagining the arenas and agents of social protection. It requires arenas in which the circle of those entitled to protection matches the circle of those subject to risk; and it requires agents whose protective capacities and regulatory powers are sufficiently robust and broad to effectively rein in transnational private powers and to pacify global finance.

#### Competitiveness and leadership necessitate is a state of global inequality.

William Davies 14. Senior Lecturer at Goldsmiths, University of London, where he is leading the development of a new PPE Degree. How ‘competitiveness’ became one of the great unquestioned virtues of contemporary culture http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/the-cult-of-competitiveness/

The years since the banking meltdown of 2008 have witnessed a dawning awareness, that our model of capitalism is not simply producing widening inequality, but is apparently governed by the interests of a tiny minority of the population. The post-crisis period has spawned its own sociological category – ‘the 1%’ – and recently delivered its first work of grand economic theory, in Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-first Century, a book dedicated to understanding why inequality keeps on growing.

What seems to be provoking the most outrage right now is not inequality as such, which has, after all, been rising in the UK (give or take Tony Blair’s second term) since 1979, but the sense that the economic game is now being rigged. If we can put our outrage to one side for a second, this poses a couple of questions, for those interested in the sociology of legitimation. Firstly, how did mounting inequality succeed in proving culturally and politically attractive for as long as it did? And secondly, how and why has that model of justification now broken down?

In some ways, the concept of inequality is unhelpful here. There has rarely been a political or business leader who has stood up and publicly said, “society needs more inequality”. And yet, most of the policies and regulations which have driven inequality since the 1970s have been publicly known. Although it is tempting to look back and feel duped by the pre-2008 era, it was relatively clear what was going on, and how it was being justified. But rather than speak in terms of generating more inequality, policy-makers have always favoured another term, which effectively comes to the same thing: competitiveness.

My new book, The Limits of Neoliberalism: Sovereignty, Authority & The Logic of Competition, is an attempt to understand the ways in which political authority has been reconfigured in terms of the promotion of competitiveness. Competitiveness is an interesting concept, and an interesting principle on which to base social and economic institutions. When we view situations as ‘competitions’, we are assuming that participants have some vaguely equal opportunity at the outset. But we are also assuming that they are striving for maximum inequality at the conclusion. To demand ‘competitiveness’ is to demand that people prove themselves relative to one other.

It struck me, when I began my Sociology PhD on which the book is based, that competitiveness had become one of the great unquestioned virtues of contemporary culture, especially in the UK. We celebrate London because it is a competitive world city; we worship sportsmen for having won; we turn on our televisions and watch contestants competitively cooking against each other. In TV shows such as the Dragons Den or sporting contests such as the Premier League, the division between competitive entertainment and capitalism dissolves altogether. Why would it be remotely surprising, to discover that a society in which competitiveness was a supreme moral and cultural virtue, should also be one which generates increasing levels of inequality?

Unless one wants to descend into biological reductionism, the question then has to be posed: how did this state of affairs come about? To answer this, we need to turn firstly to the roots of neoliberal thinking in the 1930s. For Friedrich Hayek in London, the ordoliberals in Freiburg and Henry Simons in Chicago, competition wasn’t just one feature of a market amongst many. It was the fundamental reason why markets were politically desirable, because it conserved the uncertainty of the future. What united all forms of totalitarianism and planning, according to Hayek, was that they refused to tolerate competition. And hence a neoliberal state would be defined first and foremost as one which used its sovereign powers to defend competitive processes, using anti-trust law and other instruments.

One way of understanding neoliberalism, as Foucault has best highlighted, is as the extension of competitive principles into all walks of life, with the force of the state behind them. Sovereign power does not recede, and nor is it replaced by ‘governance’; it is reconfigured in such a way that society becomes a form of ‘game’, which produces winners and losers. My aim in The Limits of Neoliberalism is to understand some of the ways in which this comes about.

In particular, I examine how the Chicago School Law and Economics tradition achieved an overhaul (and drastic shrinkage) in the role of market regulation. And I look at how Michael Porter’s theory of ‘national competitiveness’ led to a new form of policy orientation, as the search for competitive advantage. Both of these processes have their intellectual roots in the post-War period, but achieved significant political influence from the late 1970s onwards. They are, if you like, major components of neoliberalism.

By studying these intellectual traditions, it becomes possible to see how an entire moral and philosophical worldview has developed, which assumes that inequalities are both a fair and an exciting outcome of a capitalist process which is overseen by political authorities. In that respect, the state is a constant accomplice of rising inequality, although corporations, their managers and shareholders, were the obvious beneficiaries. Drawing on the work of Luc Boltanski, I suggest that we need to understand how competition, competitiveness and, ultimately, inequality are rendered justifiable and acceptable – otherwise their sustained presence in public and private life appears simply inexplicable.

And yet, this approach also helps us to understand what exactly has broken down over recent years, which I would argue is the following: At a key moment in the history of neoliberal thought, its advocates shifted from defending markets as competitive arenas amongst many, to viewing society-as-a-whole as one big competitive arena. Under the latter model, there is no distinction between arenas of politics, economics and society. To convert money into political power, or into legal muscle, or into media influence, or into educational advantage, is justifiable, within this more brutal, capitalist model of neoliberalism. The problem that we now know as the ‘1%’ is, as has been argued of America recently, a problem of oligarchy.

Underlying it is the problem that there are no longer any external, separate or higher principles to appeal to, through which oligarchs might be challenged. Legitimate powers need other powers through which their legitimacy can be tested; this is the basic principle on which the separation of executive, legislature and judiciary is based. The same thing holds true with respect to economic power, but this is what has been lost.

Regulators, accountants, tax collectors, lawyers, public institutions, have been drawn into the economic contest, and become available to buy. To use the sort of sporting metaphor much-loved by business leaders; it’s as if the top football team has bought not only the best coaches, physios and facilities, but also bought the referee and the journalists as well. The bodies responsible for judging economic competition have lost all authority, which leaves the dream of ‘meritocracy’ or a ‘level playing field’ (crucial ideals within the neoliberal imaginary) in tatters. Politically speaking, this is as much a failure of legitimation as it is a problem of spiralling material inequality.

The result is a condition that I term ‘contingent neoliberalism’, contingent in the sense that it no longer operates with any spirit of fairness or inclusiveness. The priority is simply to prop it up at all costs. If people are irrational, then nudge them. If banks don’t lend money, then inflate their balance sheets through artificial means. If a currency is no longer taken seriously, political leaders must repeatedly guarantee it as a sovereign priority. If people protest, buy a water canon. This is a system whose own conditions are constantly falling apart, and which governments must do constant repair work on.

The outrage with the ‘1%’ (and, more accurately, with the 0.1%), the sense that even the rich are scarcely benefiting, is to be welcomed. It is also overdue. For several years, we have operated with a cultural and moral worldview which finds value only in ‘winners’. Our cities must be ‘world-leading’ to matter. Universities must be ‘excellent’, or else they dwindle. This is a philosophy which condemns the majority of spaces, people and organizations to the status of ‘losers’. It also seems entirely unable to live up to its own meritocratic ideal any longer. The discovery that, if you cut a ‘winner’ enough slack, eventually they’ll try to close down the game once and for all, should throw our obsession with competitiveness into question. And then we can consider how else to find value in things, other than their being ‘better’ than something else.

#### 1. Inclusion of the Westphalian grammar in frame-setting is an act of injustice that prevents transformative politics and makes global death inevitable.

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The politics of framing can take two distinct forms, both of which are now being practised in our globalizing world.footnote12 The first approach, which I shall call the affirmative politics of framing, contests the boundaries of existing frames while accepting the Westphalian grammar of frame-setting. In this politics, those who claim to suffer injustices of misframing seek to redraw the boundaries of existing territorial states or in some cases to create new ones. But they still assume that the territorial state is the appropriate unit within which to pose and resolve disputes about justice. For them, injustices of misframing are not a function of the general principle according to which the Westphalian order partitions political space. They arise, rather, as a result of the faulty way in which that principle has been applied. Thus, those who practise the affirmative politics of framing accept that the principle of state-territoriality is the proper basis for constituting the ‘who’ of justice. They agree, in other words, that what makes a given collection of individuals into fellow subjects of justice is their shared residence on the territory of a modern state and/or their shared membership in the political community that corresponds to such a state. Thus, far from challenging the underlying grammar of the Westphalian order, those who practise the affirmative politics of framing accept its state-territorial principle.

Precisely that principle is contested, however, in a second version of the politics of framing, which I shall call the transformative approach. For its proponents, the state-territorial principle no longer affords an adequate basis for determining the ‘who’ of justice in every case. They concede, of course, that that principle remains relevant for many purposes; thus, supporters of transformation do not propose to eliminate state-territoriality entirely. But they contend that its grammar is out of synch with the structural causes of many injustices in a globalizing world, which are not territorial in character. Examples include the financial markets, ‘offshore factories’, investment regimes and governance structures of the global economy, which determine who works for a wage and who does not; the information networks of global media and cybertechnology, which determine who is included in the circuits of communicative power and who is not; and the bio-politics of climate, disease, drugs, weapons and biotechnology, which determine who will live long and who will die young. In these matters, so fundamental to human well-being, the forces that perpetrate injustice belong not to ‘the space of places’, but to ‘the space of flows’.footnote13 Not locatable within the jurisdiction of any actual or conceivable territorial state, they cannot be made answerable to claims of justice that are framed in terms of the state-territorial principle. In their case, so the argument goes, to invoke the state-territorial principle to determine the frame is itself to commit an injustice. By partitioning political space along territorial lines, this principle insulates extra- and non-territorial powers from the reach of justice. In a globalizing world, therefore, it is less likely to serve as a remedy for misframing than as a means of inflicting or perpetuating it.

#### 2. Anti-competitive” framing pushes aside equality and collective interest---transforming value to “competitive” is an ideological power to revitalize the competition state and hollow out egalitarianism.

Pauli Kettunen 11. Professor of Political History in the Social Science Faculty of University of Helsinki. “Welfare Nationalism and Competitive Community.” In Welfare citizenship and welfare nationalism.

In their discussion on the competition state, Palan and Abbot strongly stress the diversity of the particular modes in which the competition state can be embedded in different nation-states and realised through different “state strategies”.44 Indeed, the change may take place within a remarkable institutional continuity, through an “institutional conversion”45. Old institutions of the welfare state and industrial relations can be and have been modified to serve new functions of the competitive community. Concerning working life, collective interest representation and even high social norms are considered not only as “rigidities”, but rather widely, as competitive advantages, as factors promoting the commitment of workers and the innovativeness of firms and their managements. Much of the ideological power of knowledge, training and innovation in the Nordic countries stems from the promise that competitiveness and its preconditions in the global economy can – or even must – be seen from a wider perspective than that of neo-liberalist deregulation. The concept of “social capital” has gained popularity while it has opened up new possibilities to revitalise ideas of the virtuous circle between social cohesion and economic success in the context of the competition state.

It makes a difference whether or not an individual’s opportunities to make her or himself competitive are shaped by more or less egalitarian systems of education and training, and it also makes a difference whether or not the encouragement of knowledge-based competition in working life is connected with collective institutions of social regulation. Nevertheless, a tension appears in Nordic discussions between what are presented as institutional preconditions of competitiveness and how the contents of competitiveness are conceived. At the same time as egalitarian institutions and participatory practices can be defended as preconditions for knowledge-based competitiveness, true membership in a competitive community is a matter of individual competitiveness. This consists of communicative and innovative skills and talents and reflexive capabilities of monitoring oneself from the point of view of competitiveness. From this sphere, the principles of social equality and collective interests have been pushed aside.

#### 2. Misrepresentation makes consequentialism impossible---nation-states discount background injustice.

András Miklós 09. Harvard University. “Nationalist Criticisms of Cosmopolitan Justice”. Public Reason 1 (1): 105-124.

In their general form, instrumental justifications of national partiality are unlikely to succeed, for the following general reason. As we saw, they purport to justify the claim that, whatever people’s interests consist in, we should give priority to our fellow-nationals’ interests over those of others. However, as Charles Beitz argues against what he calls the consequentialist justification of the priority to compatriots view, it is implausible that such justifications can establish this general thesis since they would have to rely on implausible empirical assumptions (1983, 593). That is, they would have to presuppose a fair background distribution of resources against which states’ taking care of the interests of their citizens might be justified. Given the hugely unequal current international distribution of resources and the tendency of free-market mechanisms to generate injustice without appropriate institutions maintaining background justice, more of international redistribution could bring about a better state of affairs from an impartial point of view. Now, Goodin recognizes that special responsibilities can be assigned to agents only against the background of a fair initial distribution of resources (1988, 685). It is very implausible to suppose that a setup where the Mozambiquean and the Swiss state are each exclusively responsible for the well-being of their own citizens produces the best overall state of affairs from an impartial point of view. However, an arrangement where each state would be allocated an equal initial per capita share of the earth’s resources, and then left free to do whatever it can to perform its special responsibility for its citizens, would still be unjust if states are not self-sufficient. Liberals share the view that the operation of free markets tends to generate injustice unless it takes place against the background of just institutions correcting for unfavorable distributive effects. Thus, even in the domestic case, partiality in special relationships is regarded as permissible only if there are background institutions that implement the impartial requirements of justice. Individuals have a duty to create and uphold such institutions that maintain the conditions of impartiality, against the background of which communal projects and personal commitments can take place. Analogously, if such just global institutions are in place that maintain a fair background distribution and correct for unjust distributive effects of market transactions, there may indeed be legitimate forms of giving priority to fellow-nationals. However, this idea is different from what the priority thesis in its general form purports to establish, as it is silent about just background institutions.

#### 5. Inability to conceptualize violence determines impact calculous.

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How we relate to others should be a central concern of the field of International Relations. However, independent political communities—states—and their interrelations have historically been the focus of the discipline of International Relations (IR), thus limiting the forms of interaction that potentially constitute the field.[1] Postpositivist accounts have repeatedly indicated the disjuncture between the conceptual constructs that IR scholars use to make sense of the world historically and the way people practice their lives, which in the end is the substance of global politics. Many critical projects including Global IR have challenged the research produced through atomistic understandings of the world, and attempts have been made to integrate other ways of knowing into the discipline (Acharya 2014, Jackson and Nexon 1999, Tickner and Wæver 2009). While the ‘critical turn’ has made IR a more plural discipline by opening space for examining different types of relations, they have still been founded on modern, western ‘ontological’ assumptions about existence that have undercut their ability to reap the full benefits of other more robustly relational ways of existing (Blaney and Tickner 2017, Shani 2008, Trownsell 2013). Because the kind of plurality practised has not effectively dealt with distinctly relational ways of living and forms of knowing in their own terms, the call that we are making here is not just about adding other perspectives to the IR cauldron. We are aspiring for a deep plurality, in which IR scholars learn to effectively engage with difference at the ontological, methodological and practical levels.

Since the issue at hand is about ontological-cosmological commitments, we proffer our particular understandings of these terms. By ontology, we mean those basic assumptions about the nature of existence that are operative within any given tradition of living and thinking. In this sense ontology is closely linked to the cosmological in that they both reflect how we conceptualize our relationship with the cosmos and our place in it (Shani 2017). They are distinct in that cosmology refers more to origin stories and to cultural, spiritual and religious practices while ontology expresses the assumptions about the primordial condition of existence that provides the underlying logic of cosmological accounts and as such of all the other cultural fruits that emerge from them. Here we focus on ontology, because it helps draw attention to and provincialize many of the fundamental assumptions made in the dominant IR tradition, many of which have become invisible or merely commonsensical by being consonant with prevalent shared meaning systems and through longstanding and conventional use.

The general inability both in the field and discipline of international relations to recognize when and how one and others are engaging existence from very distinct ontological points of departure has had a serious impact in terms of both politics and knowledge production. Promoted through globally replicated institutions including academia, media, churches, etc., conceptualizing and practicing existence based on separation has become so naturalized that other more relational forms of being have been silenced and excluded. Conflict over what counts as real arises since those applying the predominant assumptions cannot even fathom that these other ways of being can be possible, legitimate or valid. As such living in one’s own or a group’s terms becomes a struggle when they are not aligned with the more predominant logic.

Several consequences of being blind to these relational ways of living and being manifest themselves politically. First these life expressions are often “othered” and “minimized” by treating them as myths (Law 2015), legends, superstitions, or stories about how people communicate with other beings. Denigration also becomes evident when examining public policies that do not even articulate, let alone protect, these relational ways of life. Among humans, groups abound that have not been deemed worthy of civil rights protections in the process of statebuilding for not engaging the world in sufficiently “civilized” manners (Sawyer 2004). Others have been the targets of state-led violence through national forced sterilization or “population control” initiatives (Carpio 2004, Pegoraro 2015). Beyond the human, these excluded groups have clamored to protect other beings that do not translate easily into traditional legal frameworks. For example, while indigenous groups were able to get the rights of nature officially acknowledged in Ecuador’s 2008 constitution, an effective implementation of these rights has yet to be seen. Efforts to maintain a healthy relationship with the beings of land, water, air, plants and animals often come into direct conflict with “national interests,” international treaties, foreign direct investment and forms of international cooperation, as can be clearly seen in last year’s indigenous struggles at Standing Rock in the United States. In the end, the ontological nature of these clashes has been clearly echoed in the zapatistas’ claims to a world of many worlds when stating, “We are another resistance, we are another reality.”[2]

In addition to the important political implications in the field of international relations, the discipline itself has yet to consider seriously relational ways of knowing and being. Because the problematics typical of IR and the tools generated to deal with them have been identified and named through the same predominant set of existential assumptions, the conceptual capacity of the discipline to grasp and respond to these ways of knowing is limited. In fact the predominant understanding of ontology within the discipline of IR has been referred to as “scientific ontology” (Patomäki and Wight 2000, Jackson 2011). Here scholars fight over what exists in the world without a prior discussion as to how it is ontologically that we arrive at a place where we insist on the existential autonomy of categories in the first place. This means that we keep studying these cosmologies through ontologically incommensurate filters (not based on similar existential assumptions) thinking that in this way we will still be able to understand them and then use the knowledge generated through reduced filters to find effective strategies for engagement. Yet our ontological parochialism still translates into epistemic violence by not being able to hear, understand, engage their world in their own ontological terms. Simultaneously we continue to generate a skewed picture of the kinds of knowing and being practiced in distinct parts of the world and subsequently of world politics. Consequently the resulting “intelligibility gap” still reinforces certain ways of being and knowing in the world as more legitimate or acceptable than others, thus reinforcing the source of cosmological insecurity for those falling outside these parameters.

#### The ILO is doomed---backlash and technology destroy the foundations of order

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This task was complicated by the Cold War, but “the free world” (as Americans then called the noncommunist countries) continued to develop along Wilsonian lines. Inevitable compromises, such as U.S. support for ruthless dictators and military rulers in many parts of the world, were seen as regrettable necessities imposed by the need to fight the much greater evil of Soviet communism. When the Berlin Wall fell, in 1989, it seemed that the opportunity for a Wilsonian world order had finally come. The former Soviet empire could be reconstructed along Wilsonian lines, and the West could embrace Wilsonian principles more consistently now that the Soviet threat had disappeared. Self-determination, the rule of law between and within countries, liberal economics, and the protection of human rights: the “new world order” that both the George H. W. Bush and the Clinton administrations worked to create was very much in the Wilsonian mold.

Today, however, the most important fact in world politics is that this noble effort has failed. The next stage in world history will not unfold along Wilsonian lines. The nations of the earth will continue to seek some kind of political order, because they must. And human rights activists and others will continue to work toward their goals. But the dream of a universal order, grounded in law, that secures peace between countries and democracy inside them will figure less and less in the work of world leaders.

To state this truth is not to welcome it. There are many advantages to a Wilsonian world order, even when that order is partial and incomplete. Many analysts, some associated with the presidential campaign of former U.S. Vice President Joe Biden, think they can put Humpty Dumpty together again. One wishes them every success. But the centrifugal forces tearing at the Wilsonian order are so deeply rooted in the nature of the contemporary world that not even the end of the Trump era can revive the Wilsonian project in its most ambitious form. Although Wilsonian ideals will not disappear and there will be a continuing influence of Wilsonian thought on U.S. foreign policies, the halcyon days of the post–Cold War era, when American presidents organized their foreign policies around the principles of liberal internationalism, are unlikely to return anytime soon.

THE ORDER OF THINGS

Wilsonianism is only one version of a rules-based world order among many. The Westphalian system, which emerged in Europe after the Thirty Years’ War ended in 1648, and the Congress system, which arose in the wake of the Napoleonic Wars of the early nineteenth century, were both rules-based and even law-based; some of the foundational ideas of international law date from those eras. And the Holy Roman Empire—a transnational collection of territories that stretched from France into modern-day Poland and from Hamburg to Milan—was an international system that foreshadowed the European Union, with highly complex rules governing everything from trade to sovereign inheritance among princely houses.

As for human rights, by the early twentieth century, the pre-Wilsonian European system had been moving for a century in the direction of putting egregious violations of human rights onto the international agenda. Then, as now, it was chiefly weak countries whose oppressive behavior attracted the most attention. The genocidal murder of Ottoman Christian minorities at the hands of Ottoman troops and irregular forces in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries received substantially more attention than atrocities carried out around the same time by Russian forces against rebellious Muslim peoples in the Caucasus. No delegation of European powers came to Washington to discuss the treatment of Native Americans or to make representations concerning the status of African Americans. Nevertheless, the pre-Wilsonian European order had moved significantly in the direction of elevating human rights to the level of diplomacy.

Wilson, therefore, was not introducing the ideas of world order and human rights to a collection of previously anarchic states and unenlightened polities. Rather, his quest was to reform an existing international order whose defects had been conclusively demonstrated by the horrors of World War I. In the pre-Wilsonian order, established dynastic rulers were generally regarded as legitimate, and interventions such as the 1849 Russian invasion of Hungary, which restored Habsburg rule, were considered lawful. Except in the most glaring instances, states were more or less free to treat their citizens or subjects as they wished, and although governments were expected to observe the accepted principles of public international law, no supranational body was charged with the enforcement of these standards. The preservation of the balance of power was invoked as a goal to guide states; war, although regrettable, was seen as a legitimate element of the system. From Wilson’s standpoint, these were fatal flaws that made future conflagrations inevitable. To redress them, he sought to build an order in which states would accept enforceable legal restrictions on their behavior at home and their international conduct.

That never quite materialized, but until recent years, the U.S.-led postwar order resembled Wilson’s vision in important respects. And, it should be noted, that vision is not equally dead everywhere. Although Wilson was an American, his view of world order was first and foremost developed as a method for managing international politics in Europe, and it is in Europe where Wilson’s ideas have had their greatest success and where their prospects continue to look strongest. His ideas were treated with bitter and cynical contempt by most European statesmen when he first proposed them, but they later became the fundamental basis of the European order, enshrined in the laws and practices of the EU. Arguably, no ruler since Charlemagne has made as deep an impression on the European political order as the much-mocked Presbyterian from the Shenandoah Valley.

THE ARC OF HISTORY

Beyond Europe, the prospects for the Wilsonian order are bleak. The reasons behind its demise, however, are different from what many assume. Critics of the Wilsonian approach to foreign affairs often decry what they see as its idealism. In fact, as Wilson demonstrated during the negotiations over the Treaty of Versailles, he was perfectly capable of the most cynical realpolitik when it suited him. The real problem of Wilsonianism is not a naive faith in good intentions but a simplistic view of the historical process, especially when it comes to the impact of technological progress on human social order. Wilson’s problem was not that he was a prig but that he was a Whig.

Like early-twentieth-century progressives generally and many American intellectuals to this day, Wilson was a liberal determinist of the Anglo-Saxon school; he shared the optimism of what the scholar Herbert Butterfield called “the Whig historians,” the Victorian-era British thinkers who saw human history as a narrative of inexorable progress and betterment. Wilson believed that the so-called ordered liberty that characterized the Anglo-American countries had opened a path to permanent prosperity and peace. This belief represents a sort of Anglo-Saxon Hegelianism and holds that the mix of free markets, free government, and the rule of law that developed in the United Kingdom and the United States is inevitably transforming the rest of the world—and that as this process continues, the world will slowly and for the most part voluntarily converge on the values that made the Anglo-Saxon world as wealthy, attractive, and free as it has become.

Wilson was the devout son of a minister, deeply steeped in Calvinist teachings about predestination and the utter sovereignty of God, and he believed that the arc of progress was fated. The future would fulfill biblical prophecies of a coming millennium: a thousand-year reign of peace and prosperity before the final consummation of human existence, when a returning Christ would unite heaven and earth. (Today’s Wilsonians have given this determinism a secular twist: in their eyes, liberalism will rule the future and bring humanity to “the end of history” as a result of human nature rather than divine purpose.)

Wilson believed that the defeat of imperial Germany in World War I and the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian, Russian, and Ottoman empires meant that the hour of a universal League of Nations had finally arrived. In 1945, American leaders ranging from Eleanor Roosevelt and Henry Wallace on the left to Wendell Willkie and Thomas Dewey on the right would interpret the fall of Germany and Japan in much the same way. In the early 1990s, leading U.S. foreign policymakers and commentators saw the fall of the Soviet Union through the same deterministic prism: as a signal that the time had come for a truly global and truly liberal world order. On all three occasions, Wilsonian order builders seemed to be in sight of their goal. But each time, like Ulysses, they were blown off course by contrary winds.

TECHNICAL DIFFICULTIES

Today, those winds are gaining strength. Anyone hoping to reinvigorate the flagging Wilsonian project must contend with a number of obstacles. The most obvious is the return of ideology-fueled geopolitics. China, Russia, and a number of smaller powers aligned with them—Iran, for example—correctly see Wilsonian ideals as a deadly threat to their domestic arrangements. Earlier in the post–Cold War period, U.S. primacy was so thorough that those countries attempted to downplay or disguise their opposition to the prevailing pro-democracy consensus. Beginning in U.S. President Barack Obama’s second term, however, and continuing through the Trump era, they have become less inhibited. Seeing Wilsonianism as a cover for American and, to some degree, EU ambitions, Beijing and Moscow have grown increasingly bold about contesting Wilsonian ideas and initiatives inside international institutions such as the UN and on the ground in places from Syria to the South China Sea.

These powers’ opposition to the Wilsonian order is corrosive in several ways. It raises the risks and costs for Wilsonian powers to intervene in conflicts beyond their own borders. Consider, for example, how Iranian and Russian support for the Assad regime in Syria has helped prevent the United States and European countries from getting more directly involved in that country’s civil war. The presence of great powers in the anti-Wilsonian coalition also provides shelter and assistance to smaller powers that otherwise might not choose to resist the status quo. Finally, the membership of countries such as China and Russia in international institutions makes it more difficult for those institutions to operate in support of Wilsonian norms: take, for example, Chinese and Russian vetoes in the UN Security Council, the election of anti-Wilsonian representatives to various UN bodies, and the opposition by countries such as Hungary and Poland to EU measures intended to promote the rule of law.

Meanwhile, the torrent of technological innovation and change known as “the information revolution” creates obstacles for Wilsonian goals within countries and in the international system. The irony is that Wilsonians often believe that technological progress will make the world more governable and politics more rational—even if it also adds to the danger of war by making it so much more destructive. Wilson himself believed just that, as did the postwar order builders and the liberals who sought to extend the U.S.-led order after the Cold War. Each time, however, this faith in technological change was misplaced. As seen most recently with the rise of the Internet, although new technologies often contribute to the spread of liberal ideas and practices, they can also undermine democratic systems and aid authoritarian regimes.

Today, as new technologies disrupt entire industries, and as social media upends the news media and election campaigning, politics is becoming more turbulent and polarized in many countries. That makes the victory of populist

and antiestablishment candidates from both the left and the right more likely in many places. It also makes it harder for national leaders to pursue the compromises that international cooperation inevitably requires and increases the chances that incoming governments will refuse to be bound by the acts of their predecessors.

The information revolution is destabilizing international life in other ways that make it harder for rules-based international institutions to cope. Take, for example, the issue of arms control, a central concern of Wilsonian foreign policy since World War I and one that grew even more important following the development of nuclear weapons. Wilsonians prioritize arms control not just because nuclear warfare could destroy the human race but also because, even if unused, nuclear weapons or their equivalent put the Wilsonian dream of a completely rules-based, law-bound international order out of reach. Weapons of mass destruction guarantee exactly the kind of state sovereignty that Wilsonians think is incompatible with humanity’s long-term security. One cannot easily stage a humanitarian intervention against a nuclear power.

The fight against proliferation has had its successes, and the spread of nuclear weapons has been delayed—but it has not stopped, and the fight is getting harder over time. In the 1940s, it took the world’s richest nation and a consortium of leading scientists to assemble the first nuclear weapon. Today, second- and third-rate scientific establishments in low-income countries can manage the feat. That does not mean that the fight against proliferation should be abandoned. It is merely a reminder that not all diseases have cures.

What is more, the technological progress that underlies the information revolution significantly exacerbates the problem of arms control. The development of cyberweapons and the potential of biological agents to inflict strategic damage on adversaries—graphically demonstrated by the COVID-19 pandemic—serve as warnings that new tools of warfare will be significantly more difficult to monitor or control than nuclear technology. Effective arms control in these fields may well not be possible. The science is changing too quickly, the research behind them is too hard to detect, and too many of the key technologies cannot be banned outright because they also have beneficial civilian applications.

In addition, economic incentives that did not exist in the Cold War are now pushing arms races in new fields. Nuclear weapons and long-range missile technology were extremely expensive and brought few benefits to the civilian economy. Biological and technological research, by contrast, are critical for any country or company that hopes to remain competitive in the twenty-first century. An uncontrollable, multipolar arms race across a range of cutting-edge technologies is on the horizon, and it will undercut hopes for a revived Wilsonian order.

IT’S NOT FOR EVERYBODY

One of the central assumptions behind the quest for a Wilsonian order is the belief that as countries develop, they become more similar to already developed countries and will eventually converge on the liberal capitalist model that shapes North America and western Europe. The Wilsonian project requires a high degree of convergence to succeed; the member states of a Wilsonian order must be democratic, and they must be willing and able to conduct their international relations within liberal multilateral institutions.

At least for the medium term, the belief in convergence can no longer be sustained. Today, China, India, Russia, and Turkey all seem less likely to converge on liberal democracy than they did in 1990. These countries and many others have developed economically and technologically not in order to become more like the West but rather to achieve a deeper independence from the West and to pursue civilizational and political goals of their own.

In truth, Wilsonianism is a particularly European solution to a particularly European set of problems. Since the fall of the Roman Empire, Europe has been divided into peer and near-peer competitors. War was the constant condition of Europe for much of its history, and Europe’s global dominance in the nineteenth century and early twentieth century can be attributed in no small part to the long contest for supremacy between France and the United Kingdom, which promoted developments in finance, state organization, industrial techniques, and the art of war that made European states fierce and ferocious competitors.

With the specter of great-power war constantly hanging over them, European states developed a more intricate system of diplomacy and international politics than did countries in other parts of the world. Well-developed international institutions and doctrines of legitimacy existed in Europe well before Wilson sailed across the Atlantic to pitch the League of Nations, which was in essence an upgraded version of preexisting European forms of international governance. Although it would take another devastating world war to ensure that Germany, as well as its Western neighbors, would adhere to the rules of a new system, Europe was already prepared for the establishment of a Wilsonian order.

But Europe’s experience has not been the global norm. Although China has been periodically invaded by nomads, and there were periods in its history when several independent Chinese states struggled for power, China has been a single entity for most of its history. The idea of a single legitimate state with no true international peers is as deeply embedded in the political culture of China as the idea of a multistate system grounded in mutual recognition is embedded in that of Europe. There have been clashes among Chinese, Japanese, and Koreans, but until the late nineteenth century, interstate conflict was rare.

In human history as a whole, enduring civilizational states seem more typical than the European pattern of rivalry among peer states. Early modern India was dominated by the Mughal Empire. Between the sixteenth century and the nineteenth century, the Ottoman and Persian Empires dominated what is now known as the Middle East. And the Incas and the Aztecs knew no true rivals in their regions. War seems universal or nearly so among human cultures, but the European pattern, in which an escalating cycle of war forced a mobilization and the development of technological, political, and bureaucratic resources to ensure the survival of the state, does not seem to have characterized international life in the rest of the world.

For states and peoples in much of the world, the problem of modern history that needed to be solved was not the recurrence of great-power conflict. The problem, instead, was figuring out how to drive European powers away, which involved a wrenching cultural and economic adjustment in order to harness natural and industrial resources. Europe’s internecine quarrels struck non-Europeans not as an existential civilizational challenge to be solved but as a welcome opportunity to achieve independence.

Postcolonial and non-Western states often joined international institutions as a way to recover and enhance their sovereignty, not to surrender it, and their chief interest in international law was to protect weak states from strong ones, not to limit the power of national leaders to consolidate their authority. Unlike their European counterparts, these states did not have formative political experiences of tyrannical regimes suppressing dissent and drafting helpless populations into the service of colonial conquest. Their experiences, instead, involved a humiliating consciousness of the inability of local authorities and elites to protect their subjects and citizens from the arrogant actions and decrees of foreign powers. After colonialism formally ended and nascent countries began to assert control over their new territories, the classic problems of governance in the postcolonial world remained weak states and compromised sovereignty.

Even within Europe, differences in historical experiences help explain varying levels of commitment to Wilsonian ideals. Countries such as France, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands came to the EU understanding that they could meet their basic national goals only by pooling their sovereignty. For many former Warsaw Pact members, however, the motive for joining Western clubs such as the EU and NATO was to regain their lost sovereignty. They did not share the feelings of guilt and remorse over the colonial past—and, in Germany, over the Holocaust—that led many in western Europe to embrace the idea of a new approach to international affairs, and they felt no qualms about taking full advantage of the privileges of EU and NATO membership without feeling in any way bound by those organizations’ stated tenets, which many regarded as hypocritical boilerplate.

EXPERT TEXPERT

The recent rise of populist movements across the West has revealed another danger to the Wilsonian project. If the United States could elect Donald Trump as president in 2016, what might it do in the future? What might the electorates in other important countries do? And if the Wilsonian order has become so controversial in the West, what are its prospects in the rest of the world?

Wilson lived in an era when democratic governance faced problems that many feared were insurmountable. The Industrial Revolution had divided American society, creating unprecedented levels of inequality. Titanic corporations and trusts had acquired immense political power and were quite selfishly exploiting that power to resist all challenges to their economic interests. At that time, the richest man in the United States, John D. Rockefeller, had a fortune greater than the annual budget of the federal government. By contrast, in 2020, the wealthiest American, Jeff Bezos, had a net worth equal to about three percent of budgeted federal expenditures.

Yet from the standpoint of Wilson and his fellow progressives, the solution to these problems could not be simply to vest power in the voters. At the time, most Americans still had an eighth-grade education or less, and a wave of migration from Europe had filled the country’s burgeoning cities with millions of voters who could not speak English, were often illiterate, and routinely voted for corrupt urban machine politicians.

The progressives’ answer to this problem was to support the creation of an apolitical expert class of managers and administrators. The progressives sought to build an administrative state that would curb the excessive power of the rich and redress the moral and political deficiencies of the poor. (Prohibition was an important part of Wilson’s electoral program, and during World War I and afterward, he moved aggressively to arrest and in some cases deport socialists and other radicals.) Through measures such as improved education, strict limits on immigration, and eugenic birth-control policies, the progressives hoped to create better-educated and more responsible voters who would reliably support the technocratic state.

A century later, elements of this progressive thinking remain critical to Wilsonian governance in the United States and elsewhere, but public support is less readily forthcoming than in the past. The Internet and social media have undermined respect for all forms of expertise. Ordinary citizens today are significantly better educated and feel less need to rely on expert guidance. And events including the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, the 2008 financial crisis, and the inept government responses during the 2020 pandemic have seriously reduced confidence in experts and technocrats, whom many people have come to see as forming a nefarious “deep state.”

International institutions face an even greater crisis of confidence. Voters skeptical of the value of technocratic rule by fellow citizens are even more skeptical of foreign technocrats with suspiciously cosmopolitan views. Just as the inhabitants of European colonial territories preferred home rule (even when badly administered) to rule by colonial civil servants (even when competent), many people in the West and in the postcolonial world are likely to reject even the best-intentioned plans of global institutions.

Meanwhile, in developed countries, problems such as the loss of manufacturing jobs, the stagnation or decline of wages, persistent poverty among minority groups, and the opioid epidemic have resisted technocratic solutions. And when it comes to international challenges such as climate change and mass migration, there is little evidence that the cumbersome institutions of global governance and the quarrelsome countries that run them will produce the kind of cheap, elegant solutions that could inspire public trust.

WHAT IT MEANS FOR BIDEN

For all these reasons, the movement away from the Wilsonian order is likely to continue, and world politics will increasingly be carried out along non-Wilsonian and in some cases even anti-Wilsonian lines. Institutions such as NATO, the UN, and the World Trade Organization may well survive (bureaucratic tenacity should never be discounted), but they will be less able and perhaps less willing to fulfill even their original purposes, much less take on new challenges. Meanwhile, the international order will increasingly be shaped by states that are on diverging paths. This does not mean an inevitable future of civilizational clashes, but it does mean that global institutions will have to accommodate a much wider range of views and values than they have in the past.

There is hope that many of the gains of the Wilsonian order can be preserved and perhaps in a few areas even extended. But fixating on past glories will not help develop the ideas and policies needed in an increasingly dangerous time. Non-Wilsonian orders have existed both in Europe and in other parts of the world in the past, and the nations of the world will likely need to draw on these examples as they seek to cobble together some kind of framework for stability and, if possible, peace under contemporary conditions.

For U.S. policymakers, the developing crisis of the Wilsonian order worldwide presents vexing problems that are likely to preoccupy presidential administrations for decades to come. One problem is that many career officials and powerful voices in Congress, civil society organizations, and the press deeply believe not only that a Wilsonian foreign policy is a good and useful thing for the United States but also that it is the only path to peace and security and even to the survival of civilization and humanity. They will continue to fight for their cause, conducting trench warfare inside the bureaucracy and employing congressional oversight powers and steady leaks to sympathetic press outlets to keep the flame alive.

Those factions will be hemmed in by the fact that any internationalist coalition in American foreign policy must rely to a significant degree on Wilsonian voters. But a generation of overreach and poor political judgment has significantly reduced the credibility of Wilsonian ideas among the American electorate. Neither President George W. Bush’s nation-building disaster in Iraq nor Obama’s humanitarian-intervention fiasco in Libya struck most Americans as successful, and there is little public enthusiasm for democracy building abroad.

#### Our contestation of the “who” of politics is open cosmopolitanism. Think the WSF’s transnational, crisscrossed networks of anti-nationalist, open public spheres that reimagine just, desirable future---bottom up, agile movements can address global crisis by resisting hegemonic lifeworlds of competition.

Giuseppe Caruso 17. “Open Cosmopolitanism and the World Social Forum: Global Resistance, Emancipation, and the Activists’ Vision of a Better World.” Globalizations, 14:4, 504-518, DOI: 10.1080/14747731.2016.1254413

The resurgence over the past three decades of a cosmopolitan discourse is related to, on the one hand, the expansion of market-led globalisation and, on the other, the intensification of social and political mobilisation for social justice. The fall of the Berlin Wall introduced a vision of global unity predicated on the global spread of neo-liberal doctrines. Liberalisation, privatisation, and devolution fostered by global governance institutions—the World Bank, IMF, and WTO—affected the global dynamics of production, trade, and governance. Concurrently, a global culture began to develop carried by waves of consumer goods and by the flooding of the global airwaves (and fibre optics) with entertainment products which established or reinforced global cultural stereotypes and entrenched values of competition, individualism, and consumerism. Narratives about the survival of the fittest increasingly express human relationships and social arrangements

As neo-liberalism was hailed by conservative elites as the panacea to social problems and the engine of global development, its dark side was increasingly resisted in protests around the world targeting labour market deregulation, environmental degradation, poverty, inequality, and exploitation. Localised forms of resistance grew in scale with the intensification of electronic communication between activists. In 1999, weaving networks that criss-crossed the planet, an unprecedented activist convergence burst into the public scene in the Seattle mobilisation against the WTO. The critical mass achieved in Seattle moved in waves to successive demonstrations such as those against the World Bank and the IMF in Prague in 2000 or the G8 in Genoa in 2001 (Della Porta, Andretta, Mosca, & Reiter, 2006; Pleyers, 2010; Smith, Byrd, Reese, & Smythe, 2011). In January 2001, the first World Social Forum (WSF) took place in Porto Alegre, Brazil (Conway, 2013; Juris, 2008a; Teivainen, in press). Grown out of the alterglobalisation movement and shaped by Brazilian activists, WSF’s more recent roots lay in the anti-imperialist, anti-colonialist, peace, and pro-democracy movements since the 1960s and in the alternative NGO forums to the UN conferences of the 1990s (Correa Leite, 2003; Fisher & Ponniah, 2003; Glasius, 2005; Seoane & Taddei, 2002; Wallerstein, 2004; Waterman, 2004).

The WSF is the world’s largest and most diverse transnational activist initiative to date. Its global events in Brazil, India, Kenya, Mali, Pakistan, Venezuela, Senegal, Tunisia, and Canada, and the dozens of regional, national, and local avatars have gathered millions of participants and tens of thousands of civil society organisations and social movements (Massiah, 2011).1 The WSF was developed as a counter-event to the World Economic Forum (WEF), a gathering of the world’s wealthiest CEOs and most influential finance ministers, heads of government, and academics. Its meetings focus on market expansion and economic development. WSF’s activists, instead, stress social and environmental justice when imagining desirable futures. They privilege equity over individual wealth, harmony with over exploitation of the environment, and shared responsibility over profit. The WSF has been described as a global public sphere (Conway & Singh, 2009; Doerr, 2008; Glasius, 2005; Hardt, 2002), a global network of social movements (Byrd & Jasny, 2010; Juris, 2008a; Waterman, 2004), a utopian space (Tormey, 2005), a space of intentionality (Juris, 2008b), an embryonic party (ChaseDunn & Reese, 2007; Marcuse, 2005; Patomaki & Teivainen, 2004), or a contact zone (Conway, 2011) in which alliances develop transversally (Housseini, 2013) across multiple political cleavages (Santos, 2004).

WSF’s most inspiring political and organisational innovation has been the ‘open space’. The open space, a bottom-up and participatory methodology for social change, provides a context for the creation of knowledge and experience beyond a directive pursuit of change (Whitaker, 2005). This formula rallied unprecedented numbers of activists from very diverse backgrounds. The open space is the organisational representation of the political environment in which WSF’s open cosmopolitanism takes shape. WSF’s unique cosmopolitan vision is developed both as resistance against neo-liberal cosmopolitanism and as a methodology of individual and collective emancipation. The nature of WSF’s cosmopolitan aspiration has been discussed by Janet Conway and Boaventura de Souza Santos. Scholars familiar with the WSF, they framed WSF’s cosmopolitanism as decolonial (Conway 2011, 2013) 2 and subaltern (Santos, 2004, 2005a). Dialogue (Conway, 2012) and translation (Santos, 2005b) are among the strategies deployed to develop WSF’s field and to extend its reach across world society. The two authors differ in the understandings of the tensions and conflicts in the WSF. Santos sees the cleavages traversing the WSF as a guarantee of openness against the domination of one ideological and organisational form. Conway warns about power dynamics among WSF participants and points at the contradictions of a space in which structures of domination not only are not challenged, but through denial are also in fact strengthened.

WSF’s open cosmopolitanism, I argue, invokes a struggle for global justice built on dissent and resistance, driven by emancipatory aspirations, and fuelled by a global alliance against neo-liberal globalisation: dissent against any totalitarianism that denies social complexities, that attempts to subsume them forcefully, or that attempts to annihilate them; resistance against hegemonic lifeworlds; emancipatory because it is predicated on individuals’ and groups’ self-determination. In previous examinations, I have described the WSF in terms of ‘emancipatory cosmopolitanism’ (2012b) and ‘open cosmopolitanism’ (2012a). Here, I consider the latter as a recursive process of power and resistance, conflict and emancipation taking place both across and within the boundaries of WSF’s open space. Open cosmopolitanism understands that denied conflict between allies reinforces dynamics of domination and that courageous engagements of those conflicts, however painful and apparently destabilising of activists’ contingent goals, promote trust and, potentially, effectiveness (Caruso, 2004).

Open cosmopolitanism is not based on a blueprint, it develops in fits and starts, it is traversed by powerful ambivalences, it often suffers setbacks, and its outcomes are not foreseeable and are always open to reframing and reinterpretation as the activists’ work develops into new and previously unimaginable forms. Power dynamics, ideological cleavages, and pragmatic concerns about organisation, alliance building, and strategic efficacy traverse the open space and, according to some, challenge WSF’s ability to pursue its goals (Worth & Buckley, 2009; Zibechi, 2012). Criticism centred on the extent to which the excitement that the WSF generated among activists may be justified; on the gap between values and practices in the open space; on the disappointment generated by the unrealistic investments in the possibility for global social change afforded by the WSF; and, more recently, on the ability of the WSF to adapt to a changed political environment. Tensions, internal struggles, and critical analysis, I argue, contribute to make WSF’s cosmopolitan project, though apparently harder to achieve, more realistic (but by no means easier) than statements of universal solidarity among global activists or, even more, among all human beings united in a common destiny on a shared planet. When acknowledged and worked through, conflicts and power dynamics contribute to the recursive nature of the struggle for individual and collective emancipation. As conflicts are engaged and negotiated and as the ambivalent nature of human existence is made central to groups’ organisation, resistance to domination becomes the ground on which the alternative is constructed and emancipation can realistically be achieved. WSF’s open cosmopolitanism is here understood as the struggle between Empire and Cosmopolis as discussed by Gills (2005). This struggle is not only represented by the opposition of WSF’s Cosmopolis to the WEF’s Empire, but also, more broadly, as the struggle between two contending visions of human existence and global community. With Gills, I understand these contending visions as the expression of a ‘perennial historical tension, [which is] deeply embedded in history and human psyche’ (2005, p. 5). I have been involved in the WSF since 2002. The present article is based on material collected during participant observation in four continents complemented by extensive virtual ethnography and unstructured interviews.3 The remainder of this article is organised as follows. The next section discusses WSF’s founding cosmopolitan principles. The following introduces WSF’s cosmopolitan practices. Section 4 discusses conflict in the open space. Section 5 spells out WSF’s open cosmopolitanism. Section 6 concludes.

## Adv 1

#### No holdups or “monoculture”---zero empirical proof---all innovation examples goes neg. Cites their solvency advocate that revoked his claim.

Keith Mallinson 16. Founder of WiseHarbor, providing expert commercial consultancy since 2007 to technology and service businesses in wired and wireless telecommunications, media and entertainment serving consumer and professional markets. He is an industry expert and consultant with 25 years of experience and extensive knowledge of the ICT industries and markets, including the IP-rich 2G/3G/4G mobile communications sector. His clients include several major companies in ICT. He is often engaged as a testifying expert witness in patent licensing agreement disputes and in other litigation including asset valuations, damages assessments and in antitrust cases. He is also a regular columnist with FierceWireless and IP Finance. “Mallinson on Patent Holdup and Holdout: for IP Finance 16th August 2016”. https://www.wiseharbor.com/pdfs/Mallinson%20on%20Holdup%20and%20Holdout%20for%20IP%20Finance%2016%20Aug%202016.pdf

“Patent holdup” is manifestly not a systemic problem. There is no empirical evidence of harm to markets or consumers, and such abundant proof of market success—particularly for innovative smartphones and the extensive 3G and 4G networks to which they are connected—including seven billion cellular connections and modest licensing costs totalling only around five percent of device prices.

Unmentionable claims

I came upon a paper entitled “Patent Holdup: Myth or Reality?” by Carl Shapiro, dated 6 th October 2015, which was circulated as a hard-copy and presented at an IEEE-SIIT conference at the Intelsponsored key-note address. In this, the author concedes that there are “few documented instances of actual holdups” and that they are “exceedingly difficult for researchers to detect and reliably quantify.” He has backed off from his previous claims of prevalence of “patent holdup” where he stated “patentees regularly settle with companies in the information technology industries for far more money than their inventions are actually worth. These companies are paying holdup money to avoid the threat of infringement.” Shapiro has retreated due to lack of empirical support for these original claims which is because portfolio licensing among many licensees on FRAND terms together with the courts ensure that holdup royalties are rarely demanded and are never paid. However, Shapiro takes another position where there is also no supporting evidence. He now claims that the social costs caused by the alleged “patent holdup” problem are in the actions taken to prevent holdup and in the opportunities forgone under the threat of “patent holdup.”

His 2015 paper is labelled a preliminary draft that should not be quoted, yet the verbatim thesis of this most outspoken author is evidently being adopted elsewhere; including in a speech by the US Department of Justice’s Chief Economist, Nancy Rose, at a George Washington University conference on “Patents in Telecoms” in November 2015. In this, she analogises that “patent holdup” is like dark matter in the universe – something that cannot itself be detected but is present. She said that the existence of dark matter can be inferred from effects on visible matter.

With the passing of ten months since Shapiro presented his paper at the IEEE event and with the DoJ’s name endorsing this latest development in “patent holdup” theory, I believe it is high time to shine some light on the flaws in arguments made by Shapiro and Rose by making their writings available and by rebutting them here. I do not see why they should enjoy the privilege of being heard and given the opportunity to persuade, while also indefinitely being able to shield their postulations from scrutiny or criticism.

A big bluff

At first glance of the Shapiro paper’s abstract it seems he is going to provide the empirical evidence supporting “patent holdup” theory that many of us have been asking and waiting for over many years. Instead, careful wording sidesteps this issue again and again. He states that “the general theory of holdup enjoys substantial empirical support.” This alone is woefully insufficient: critics of “patent holdup” theory claim these are inapplicable to patents in general and to SEPs in particular. Realising this while unwilling to admit this shortcoming, Shapiro goes on to state that “applying the same theoretical and empirical methodologies to “patent holdup” confirms that patent holdup is a substantial real-world problem.” This seems conclusive; but instead of supporting this assertion with any empirical observations in patent licensing, he merely inflates his claim by stating that “patent holdup is shown to be an especially difficult type of holdup to manage.” Patent holdup remains a theoretical problem absent specific empirical support.

In the paper’s main text Shapiro goes on to claim that he “debunk[s] the assertion that the theory of patent holdup lacks empirical support,” but he identifies no such empirical support there either. In his analysis he asserts that the “holdup problem” is actually “the potential for holdup” leading to costs in (1) preventing or mitigating actual holdup, (2) the deadweight loss associated with activities deterred by the prospect of holdup; and (3) the costs caused by actual holdup that nonetheless occur. However, he provides no more than descriptions of his assertions: as with his original theory (3), no empirical support for his revised theory, as indicated in (1) and (2), is provided either.

According to Shapiro and Rose, there are three ways in which the alleged problems with holdup can be mitigated or eliminated, each of which has social costs: vertical integration, long-term contracts and lessspecific investment. Shapiro maintains that, in general, this is all widely considered to be well established empirically. Even if one accepts that premise, it is also necessary to identify, depict and quantify with respect to costs how each of these effects is occurring in alleged “patent holdup.” Shapiro dismisses vertical integration with acquisition of all patents required for manufacture as not being viable because there are many patents under widespread ownership and because competing manufacturers also need to use the same patented technologies. He regards FRAND arrangements as costly and inefficient, but does not even assess these anecdotally, let alone empirically. Similarly, he presents no evidence that specific investments have been curtailed with products subject to patents in general or SEPs in particular.

# 1NR

## T CWS

#### 2. Only accessible literature base.

Commissioner Noah J. Phillips 18. Before the Federal Trade Commission. “Competition and Consumer Protection in the 21st Century”. https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public\_events/1415284/ftc\_hearings\_session\_5\_transcript\_11-1-18\_0.pdf

So, today, we take on the very modest task of looking both at vertical mergers and the consumer welfare standard. Both have made headlines of late, which is not always true in the antitrust world. The Department of Justice’s ongoing litigation regarding the mergers of AT&T and Time Warner has drawn a great bit of attention, in particular, to vertical merger law and the economic theories surrounding it.

And we have heard a great deal, almost every week, on op-ed pages, on television and so forth, regarding the consumer welfare standard. So this is an important time, it is an appropriate time for the FTC to be convening a hearing on these two topics.

#### 3. It strikes a middle ground with both sides’ offense. Tons of proposals and disad scenarios.

Ariel Ezrachi 18. Slaughter and May Professor of Competition Law, The University of Oxford. Director, Oxford University Centre for Competition Law and Policy. EU Competition Law Goals and The Digital Economy. “Ezrachi - Goals and the digital economy - Working paper.pdf” https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/57115872/Ezrachi\_-\_Goals\_-\_Aug\_2018-with-cover-page-v2.pdf?Expires=1638214770&Signature=Mpj92d9khmpS0HyzF3CslPfb5dW85lbsqJCFgU7D3GFTj70U5Gmz8RSwdhVHuxhj9i9BowILCRURtQhqIJ7K04JEI63btRTbEl8KxIr46OUPivr09yML6cP3LePcVM91a6QIQCxZHlvD-CWrhFPrhKwhltMKdr2MAeQwKl~C8BcVvhWta42~SbQV5rolyiYlJSdi-Ud4-RMCW6ezyaWhgw3yaulQnnIBg7BvfT04pXgG9Ljo9ZfYx1Y1rJA8B7S~WqSCszmjSrZUoQSPjD8sxw9RuBoJVxBWrXAYIYyF9Fa-df-uhBY24PMlRIMzpOK~xHfcyxo7AQ1pGVd-3rg8QA\_\_&Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA

In this respect, it is interesting to consider the enforcement approach in the US and its relevance to EU competition regime. This is particularly so in light on current debate in the US on the need and desirability of changing the benchmark for antitrust assessment, the efficacy of US antitrust law, and its ability to deal with increased concentration and market power.145 That debate stems from the evolution of US antitrust law which has seen it being narrowed in scope over the years,146 and the rise of voices which argue in favour of widening the notion of consumer welfare and the realm of US antitrust. The alleged decline in competitiveness of US markets has led to an array of proposals (which range from moderate intervention to condemnation of bigness) and to numerous counter arguments.147

---FOOTNOTE 147 STARTS---

147 On the US debate on ‘Hipster Antitrust’ (or ‘New Brandeis Movement’) see for example: Carl Shapiro ‘Antitrust in a Time of Populism’ [2018] International Journal of Industrial Organization (forthcoming); Lina Khan ‘The New Brandeis Movement: America’s Antimonopoly Debate’ [2018] Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 131; Daniel A Crane, ‘Four questions for the neo-brandeisians’ [2018] CPI Antitrust Chronicle 63; Harry First ‘Woodstock antitrust’ [2018] CPI Antitrust Chronicle 57 ; Philip Marsden ‘Who should trust-bust? Hippocrates, not hipsters’ [2018] CPI Antitrust Chronicle 34; Howard A Shelanski, ‘Information, Innovation, and Competition Policy for the Internet [2013] U Pa LRev 1663; Herbert Hovenkamp ‘Whatever Did Happen to the Antitrust Movement?’ [2018] Notre Dame LRev (forthcoming).

---FOOTNOTE 147 ENDS---

#### The plan also violates the word core.

Tracy C. Miller and Alden Abbott 21. Tracy C. Miller, Senior Policy Research Editor. Alden Abbott, Senior Research Fellow. "POLICY SPOTLIGHT: Antitrust Policy and the Consumer Welfare Standard". Mercatus Center. 3-24-2021. https://www.mercatus.org/publications/antitrust-and-competition/policy-spotlight-antitrust-policy-and-consumer-welfare

Since the late 1970s, the Supreme Court has emphasized consumer welfare as the core antitrust policy goal, which was a change from earlier decisions emphasizing the evils of big business and the importance of protecting smaller companies. Judicial decisions under the consumer welfare standard subsequently have enunciated fact-specific standards that seek to preserve incentives for business conduct that benefits consumers. These decisions have also granted dominant firms greater freedom to engage in aggressive competition to better satisfy consumers. The focus of these cases has been whether business behavior tends toward maximizing output (taking into account quantity, quality, and improvements in innovation), consistent with unrestricted competition.

The Case for a Different Approach

* Critics of current antitrust policy argue that enforcement has been ineffective, as evidenced by a decline in competition and an increase in the average market share of firms in recent decades.
* A growing number of scholars have concluded that the consumer welfare standard is inadequate. These scholars support a populist approach that pursues a broader range of objectives such as promoting fairness, protecting labor rights, and limiting monopoly as measured by firm size and market share.
* These concerns have resulted in studies by the House Subcommittee on Antitrust, Commercial, and Administrative Law and by the Washington Center for Equitable Growth that endorse digital platform regulation, new Federal Trade Commission rulemaking, and legislation to strengthen antitrust laws, with a greater emphasis on bright-line rules.
* In February 2021, Senator Amy Klobuchar, chair of the Senate Subcommittee on Competition Policy, Antitrust, and Consumer Rights, introduced legislation that would greatly toughen the standard for evaluating mergers and lower the bar for convicting a firm of illegal monopolization.
* Other expansive antitrust reform proposals, including possible regulation or structural breakups of big platforms, may be considered by the House Subcommittee on Antitrust, Commercial, and Administrative Law.

Defense of the Consumer Welfare Standard

1. Reforming antitrust policy in a way that would abandon the consumer welfare standard is likely to do more harm than good.
2. Studies claiming that competition is declining are based largely on flawed premises. Although digital platform markets are often more concentrated than most markets in the past, firms with a large market share may still be under pressure to compete owing to the potential of existing firms and startups to develop innovative new products and services.
3. Reforms proposed by various antitrust critics such as breaking up dominant firms or prohibiting most mergers and acquisitions are likely to make consumers worse off, sacrificing the benefits of declining per-unit costs that accompany large-scale production and integration of complementary services controlled by one firm.

Broadening the scope of what constitutes a violation of antitrust law would likely create a great deal of uncertainty for firms as they seek to compete effectively and grow their market shares. Further, trying to assign weights to vaguely defined notions of fairness and labor rights along with consumer welfare would create confusion and could lead to arbitrary decisions that are not consistent with the rule of law.

#### CWS is the consistent goal.

Elyse Dorsey 20. “Antitrust in Retrograde: The Consumer Welfare Standard, Socio-Political Goals, and the Future of Enforcement”. https://gaidigitalreport.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Dorsey-Antitrust-in-Retrograde.pdf

Antitrust law has largely flourished in the last 40 or so years, having established a newfound sense of self that is both coherent and capable of achieving its ends. It benefits from a longstanding and nonpartisan support for the consumer welfare standard.65 The Supreme Court has consistently, and on a nonpartisan basis, acknowledged the economic grounding and consumer welfare goals of the antitrust laws.66 The consumer welfare standard today thus serves as a common language unifying antitrust cases and analysis. Continued disagreements over original legislative intent have not forestalled this consensus, owing to this and many other benefits (developed below), including increased certainty, clarifying and narrowing the scope of applicable goals to consider, and facilitating the rule of law.67

#### 2. Only accessible literature base.

Commissioner Noah J. Phillips 18. Before the Federal Trade Commission. “Competition and Consumer Protection in the 21st Century”. https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public\_events/1415284/ftc\_hearings\_session\_5\_transcript\_11-1-18\_0.pdf

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Ariel Ezrachi 18. Slaughter and May Professor of Competition Law, The University of Oxford. Director, Oxford University Centre for Competition Law and Policy. EU Competition Law Goals and The Digital Economy. “Ezrachi - Goals and the digital economy - Working paper.pdf” https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/57115872/Ezrachi\_-\_Goals\_-\_Aug\_2018-with-cover-page-v2.pdf?Expires=1638214770&Signature=Mpj92d9khmpS0HyzF3CslPfb5dW85lbsqJCFgU7D3GFTj70U5Gmz8RSwdhVHuxhj9i9BowILCRURtQhqIJ7K04JEI63btRTbEl8KxIr46OUPivr09yML6cP3LePcVM91a6QIQCxZHlvD-CWrhFPrhKwhltMKdr2MAeQwKl~C8BcVvhWta42~SbQV5rolyiYlJSdi-Ud4-RMCW6ezyaWhgw3yaulQnnIBg7BvfT04pXgG9Ljo9ZfYx1Y1rJA8B7S~WqSCszmjSrZUoQSPjD8sxw9RuBoJVxBWrXAYIYyF9Fa-df-uhBY24PMlRIMzpOK~xHfcyxo7AQ1pGVd-3rg8QA\_\_&Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA

In this respect, it is interesting to consider the enforcement approach in the US and its relevance to EU competition regime. This is particularly so in light on current debate in the US on the need and desirability of changing the benchmark for antitrust assessment, the efficacy of US antitrust law, and its ability to deal with increased concentration and market power.145 That debate stems from the evolution of US antitrust law which has seen it being narrowed in scope over the years,146 and the rise of voices which argue in favour of widening the notion of consumer welfare and the realm of US antitrust. The alleged decline in competitiveness of US markets has led to an array of proposals (which range from moderate intervention to condemnation of bigness) and to numerous counter arguments.147

---FOOTNOTE 147 STARTS---

147 On the US debate on ‘Hipster Antitrust’ (or ‘New Brandeis Movement’) see for example: Carl Shapiro ‘Antitrust in a Time of Populism’ [2018] International Journal of Industrial Organization (forthcoming); Lina Khan ‘The New Brandeis Movement: America’s Antimonopoly Debate’ [2018] Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 131; Daniel A Crane, ‘Four questions for the neo-brandeisians’ [2018] CPI Antitrust Chronicle 63; Harry First ‘Woodstock antitrust’ [2018] CPI Antitrust Chronicle 57 ; Philip Marsden ‘Who should trust-bust? Hippocrates, not hipsters’ [2018] CPI Antitrust Chronicle 34; Howard A Shelanski, ‘Information, Innovation, and Competition Policy for the Internet [2013] U Pa LRev 1663; Herbert Hovenkamp ‘Whatever Did Happen to the Antitrust Movement?’ [2018] Notre Dame LRev (forthcoming).

---FOOTNOTE 147 ENDS---

## 1NR---Cyber Advantage

#### No catastrophic cyberattacks---25 years of empirics prove they stay low-level and non-escalatory.

Lewis 20---senior vice president and director of the Technology Policy Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies). Lewis, James. 2020. “Dismissing Cyber Catastrophe.” Center for Strategic & International Studies. August 17, 2020. https://www.csis.org/analysis/dismissing-cyber-catastrophe.

A catastrophic cyberattack was first predicted in the mid-1990s. Since then, predictions of a catastrophe have appeared regularly and have entered the popular consciousness. As a trope, a cyber catastrophe captures our imagination, but as analysis, it remains entirely imaginary and is of dubious value as a basis for policymaking. There has never been a catastrophic cyberattack. To qualify as a catastrophe, an event must produce damaging mass effect, including casualties and destruction. The fires that swept across California last summer were a catastrophe. Covid-19 has been a catastrophe, especially in countries with inadequate responses. With man-made actions, however, a catastrophe is harder to produce than it may seem, and for cyberattacks a catastrophe requires organizational and technical skills most actors still do not possess. It requires planning, reconnaissance to find vulnerabilities, and then acquiring or building attack tools—things that require resources and experience. To achieve mass effect, either a few central targets (like an electrical grid) need to be hit or multiple targets would have to be hit simultaneously (as is the case with urban water systems), something that is itself an operational challenge. It is easier to imagine a catastrophe than to produce it. The 2003 East Coast blackout is the archetype for an attack on the U.S. electrical grid. No one died in this blackout, and services were restored in a few days. As electric production is digitized, vulnerability increases, but many electrical companies have made cybersecurity a priority. Similarly, at water treatment plants, the chemicals used to purify water are controlled in ways that make mass releases difficult. In any case, it would take a massive amount of chemicals to poison large rivers or lakes, more than most companies keep on hand, and any release would quickly be diluted. More importantly, there are powerful strategic constraints on those who have the ability to launch catastrophe attacks. We have more than two decades of experience with the use of cyber techniques and operations for coercive and criminal purposes and have a clear understanding of motives, capabilities, and intentions. We can be guided by the methods of the Strategic Bombing Survey, which used interviews and observation (rather than hypotheses) to determine effect. These methods apply equally to cyberattacks. The conclusions we can draw from this are: Nonstate actors and most states lack the capability to launch attacks that cause physical damage at any level, much less a catastrophe. There have been regular predictions every year for over a decade that nonstate actors will acquire these high-end cyber capabilities in two or three years in what has become a cycle of repetition. The monetary return is negligible, which dissuades the skilled cybercriminals (mostly Russian speaking) who might have the necessary skills. One mystery is why these groups have not been used as mercenaries, and this may reflect either a degree of control by the Russian state (if it has forbidden mercenary acts) or a degree of caution by criminals. There is enough uncertainty among potential attackers about the United States’ ability to attribute that they are unwilling to risk massive retaliation in response to a catastrophic attack. (They are perfectly willing to take the risk of attribution for espionage and coercive cyber actions.) No one has ever died from a cyberattack, and only a handful of these attacks have produced physical damage. A cyberattack is not a nuclear weapon, and it is intellectually lazy to equate them to nuclear weapons. Using a tactical nuclear weapon against an urban center would produce several hundred thousand casualties, while a strategic nuclear exchange would cause tens of millions of casualties and immense physical destruction. These are catastrophes that some hack cannot duplicate. The shadow of nuclear war distorts discussion of cyber warfare. State use of cyber operations is consistent with their broad national strategies and interests. Their primary emphasis is on espionage and political coercion. The United States has opponents and is in conflict with them, but they have no interest in launching a catastrophic cyberattack since it would certainly produce an equally catastrophic retaliation. Their goal is to stay below the “use-of-force” threshold and undertake damaging cyber actions against the United States, not start a war. This has implications for the discussion of inadvertent escalation, something that has also never occurred. The concern over escalation deserves a longer discussion, as there are both technological and strategic constraints that shape and limit risk in cyber operations, and the absence of inadvertent escalation suggests a high degree of control for cyber capabilities by advanced states. Attackers, particularly among the United States’ major opponents for whom cyber is just one of the tools for confrontation, seek to avoid actions that could trigger escalation. The United States has two opponents (China and Russia) who are capable of damaging cyberattacks. Russia has demonstrated its attack skills on the Ukrainian power grid, but neither Russia nor China would be well served by a similar attack on the United States. Iran is improving and may reach the point where it could use cyberattacks to cause major damage, but it would only do so when it has decided to engage in a major armed conflict with the United States. Iran might attack targets outside the United States and its allies with less risk and continues to experiment with cyberattacks against Israeli critical infrastructure. North Korea has not yet developed this kind of capability. One major failing of catastrophe scenarios is that they discount the robustness and resilience of modern economies. These economies present multiple targets and configurations; they are harder to damage through cyberattack than they look, given the growing (albeit incomplete) attention to cybersecurity; and experience shows that people compensate for damage and quickly repair or rebuild. This was one of the counterintuitive lessons of the Strategic Bombing Survey. Pre-war planning assumed that civilian morale and production would crumple under aerial bombardment. In fact, the opposite occurred. Resistance hardened and production was restored.1 This is a short overview of why catastrophe is unlikely. Several longer CSIS reports go into the reasons in some detail. Past performance may not necessarily predict the future, but after 25 years without a single catastrophic cyberattack, we should invoke the concept cautiously, if at all. Why then, it is raised so often? Some of the explanation for the emphasis on cyber catastrophe is hortatory. When the author of one of the first reports (in the 1990s) to sound the alarm over cyber catastrophe was asked later why he had warned of a cyber Pearl Harbor when it was clear this was not going to happen, his reply was that he hoped to scare people into action. "Catastrophe is nigh; we must act" was possibly a reasonable strategy 22 years ago, but no longer. The resilience of historical events to remain culturally significant must be taken into account for an objective assessment of cyber warfare, and this will require the United States to discard some hypothetical scenarios. The long experience of living under the shadow of nuclear annihilation still shapes American thinking and conditions the United States to expect extreme outcomes. American thinking is also shaped by the experience of 9/11, a wrenching attack that caught the United States by surprise. Fears of another 9/11 reinforce the memory of nuclear war in driving the catastrophe trope, but when applied to cyberattack, these scenarios do not track with operational requirements or the nature of opponent strategy and planning. The contours of cyber warfare are emerging, but they are not always what we discuss. Better policy will require greater objectivity.

#### No cyber impact---non state actors lack capability, Russia and China don’t have an incentive.

Lewis 20 – (James A., PhD, a senior vice president and director of the Technology Policy Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Before joining CSIS, Lewis worked at the Departments of State and Commerce as a foreign service officer and as a member of the Senior Executive Service, a political advisor to the U.S. Southern Command for Operation Just Cause, the U.S. Central Command for Operation Desert Shield, and the Central American Task Force. Lewis served on the U.S. delegations to the Cambodian peace process and the Permanent Five talks on arms transfers and nonproliferation, and he negotiated bilateral agreements on transfers of military technology to Asia and the Middle East. He led the U.S. delegation to the Wassenaar Arrangement Experts Group on advanced civilian and military technologies. Lewis led a long-running Track 2 dialogue on cybersecurity with the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations. He has served as a member of the Commerce Spectrum Management Advisory Committee, the Advisory Committee on International Communications and Information Policy, and the Advisory Committee on Commercial Remote Sensing and as an advisor to government agencies on the security and intelligence implications of foreign investment in the United States, 2020, “Dismissing Cyber Catastrophe,” [accessed 8/30/20], <https://www.csis.org/analysis/dismissing-cyber-catastrophe>, see)

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## Innovation adv

#### Holdup is regulated and self-correcting

Damien Geradin & Miguel Rato 6. \*\*Professor of Competition Law and Economics and member of the Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC) at Tilburg University \*\*Associate at Howrey LLP. "Can Standard-Setting Lead to Exploitative Abuse? A Dissonant View on Patent Hold-Up, Royalty Stacking and the Meaning of FRAND." European Competition Journal. April 2006. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=946792

C. Patent Holdout and Hold-up

A related, but distinct, strand of the literature focuses on non-cooperation between firms. Under patent holdout and hold-up theories, a firm with relevant IP emerges after a standard is set and demands high royalty payments. Thus, the focus here is not on the existence of too many rights spread across a great many rights’ holders, but rather on the questionable behaviour of one individual rights’ holder. In some instances, the firm participates in the standard setting process, at least to some extent, but either does not declare its relevant patents to the standardization body or declares them but then prices those patents unreasonably during ex postnegotiations.77 The strategy of participating in a standard but not disclosing IPR has become quite risky in recent years, since a number of firms engaged in such tactics have been prosecuted for patent misuse or breach of antitrust laws.[[1]](#footnote-1) But, of course, some holdouts never directly participate in standard setting efforts. They instead watch the process from the sidelines and reveal their patents after a standard has been set.

Nonetheless, Shapiro argues that hold-up is a regular occurrence: “[t]he principal finding in this paper is that the current U.S. patent system systematically over-rewards the owners of weak patents [defined as those covering only minor inventions], especially in the information technology sector where a single product can incorporate many patented features.”[[2]](#footnote-2) He develops a model in which patent holders use the threat of injunction to push firms into paying more for a licence than the underlying technology deserves. The intuition is that a manufacturer facing plant shutdown or a costly product redesign will be willing to pay considerably more than a patent is “worth” to avoid those costs.[[3]](#footnote-3)

Lichtman, however, offers a different view of the hold-up problem. He argues that at some point, a fragmentation of IP rights - so denigrated in the anti-commons theory - can actually be a good thing: “The large number of overlapping patents that makes it difficult for firms to license necessary rights at the same time dampens the costs associated with each specific failure to license […] some resources will come into efficient use precisely because there are so many patent holders who each can plausibly veto another firm’s use.”[[4]](#footnote-4) In other words, when a relatively large number of firms follow a patent holdout strategy, actual hold-up is far less attractive: “More patents means less money per patent holder. Less money, in turn, means less of an incentive for a firm to strategically delay in the hopes of being a patent holdout, and less of an incentive for an accidental patent holdout to actually bring suit.”[[5]](#footnote-5)

1. See e.g. *Rambus*, cited at footnote 182 below. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. See Carl Shapiro, “Injunctions, Hold-Up, and Patent Royalties,” Working Paper, Draft 17 April 2006, http://faculty.berkeley.edu/shapiro/royalties. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Mark Lemley echoes many of the same arguments, without any models: “Our goal should be to create a world in which patent owners can get paid for the technology they contribute, but in which what they get paid bears some reasonable resemblance to what they actually contributed.” See Mark Lemley, “Ten Things to Do About Patent Holdup of Standards (and One *Not* to),” working paper 2006. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. See Douglas G. Lichtman, “Patent Holdouts and the Standard-Setting Process”, *University Chicago Law and Economics, Olin Working Paper No. 292*, May 2006. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=902646 at 13. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Id. at 10. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)